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SUSPENSION OF THE POWER OF ALIENATION
IN NEW YORK*
HORACE E. WITEsmE
The statutes against suspension of the power of alienation and the
absolute ownership of property, which were adopted by the New
York Legislature in 1828,' have occasioned endless difficulty in the
many controversies that have been before the courts of this state
during almost a century, and have caused the failure of a large
number of trusts and wills during this period. Nor does it seem that
repeated adjudication has resulted in interpretations of these rules
which may be readily understood by the bar or easily applied by the
courts.2 Furthermore, the New York statutes against suspension
*This article will appear in the CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY in two installments,
the second to be published in the February issue.
tProfessor of Law, Cornell Law School.
'The legislature authorized a general revision of the statutes of New York on
Nov. 27, 1824. James Kent, Erastus Root and Benjamin F. Butler were ap-
pointed revisers, but Kent declined, and John Duer was appointed to the vacancy
by Gov. Yates. In 1825 the two younger revisers, Duer and Butler, asked for
and received a grant of larger powers, and thereafter they had practically a free
hand in codifying the laws of the state. Root having retired, Henry Wheaton
was substituted, but he resigned in 1827, and John C. Spencer was appointedto
fill his place, April 21, 1827. All of Part One of the revised statutes and all of
Part Two except Chapter I were adopted by the legislature in a special session,
which began Sept. 11, 1827, and continued for fifty-three days. The work was
continued in the regular session of 1828, and another special session in the autumn-
The entire body of the Revised Statutes was adopted on December IO, 1828, to
take effect on January I, I83O. The notes of the revisers will be found in their
report to the legislature (1828), and in the second and third editions of the
Revised Statutes. An interesting and valuable account of the revisers and their
work will be found in BUTLER, THE REVISION AND THE REVISERS (1889).
2Gray states that from the adoption of the Revised Statutes to 1914, there were
some four hundred and seventy cases reported in New York on questions of
perpetuities. GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (3d ed. I915) 568.
In the last fifteen volumes of the New York Supplement, reporting cases from
the Supreme Court and inferior courts, fifty cases appear which involve suspen-
sion of alienation by trust, accumulations, vesting or powers. Only four of these
involved trusts not created by will. They cover a period of two years and seven
months (Jan. I9, 1925 to Aug. 15, 1927).
Opinions were handed down in six cases on these subjects by the Court of
Appeals between May 25, 1926 and July 20, 1927: In re Buttner's Will, 243
N. Y. i, 152 N. E. 447 (1926); In re Chittick's Will, 243 N. Y. 3o4, 153 N. E.
83 (1926); Matter of Guaranty Tr. Co. v. Halsted, 245 N. Y. 447, 157 N. E. 739
(1927); In re Durbrow's Estate, 245 N. Y. 469, 157 N. E. 747 (1927); In re
Perkin's Estate, 245 N. Y. 478, 157 N. E. 750 (1927); In re Water Front on
Upper New York Bay, 246 N. Y. i, 157 N. E. 911 (1927).
3'
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of the power 'of alienation were adopted, in whole or in part, in no
less than thirteen jurisdictions, and have formed the basis of their
so-called rule against perpetuities.3 These rules have been the
subject of comment and criticism in a number of articles in law
periodicals.4
The object of the present discussion is primarily, to consider
whether the interpretation of these statutes against suspension of
the power of alienation and the judicial development of the rules
under them has been in accordance with the intention of the framers
of the Revised Statutes, or demanded by considerations of the
public interest,'>or productive of a desirable and workable result.
In this connection, certain modifications of the existing law will be
suggested. Before directing 6ur attention to the main purposes of the
discussion, however, it will be necessary to make a preliminary study
of the history and development of the rules under consideration, and
to state them, as briefly as may be, in their present form. The
limitations of space incident to periodical publication will compel
us to confine the discussion largely to the New York cases and
authorities. It will also be necessary to publish this paper in two
installments, the first of which will be devoted to a consideration
of those rules of law which exist in New York today in respect of
suspension of the absolute power of alienation of real property and
the absolute ownership of personal property, with particular emphasis
on such suspension by trusts of real and personal property, respec-
tively. In the second installment we will proceed to summarize the
practical results of these rules in their actual operation, and to trace
their development, and suggest certain modifications which seem
to be urgently needed.
3Arizona, California, District of Columbia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan,
Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Wisconsin.
Citations to statutes will be found in BOGERT, TRUSTS (1921) 172, n. 6o.
4Hohfeld, The Need of Remedial Legislation in the Calif. Law of Trusts and
Perpetuities (1913) I CALIF. L. REV. 305; Canfield, The New York Revised Stat-
utes and the Rule against .Perpetuities (igoi)r COL. L. REV. 224; Dwight, Powers
of Sale as Affecting Restraints on Alienation (1907) 7 COL. L. REv. 589; Rundell,
The Suspension of the Absolute Power of Alienation (1921) Ig MIcr. L. REV. 235;
Goddard, Perpetuity Statutes (1923) 22 MIcnr. L. REv. 95; Fraser, Future Interests
in Property in Minnesota (1919) 3 MINN. L. REV. 320; (1920) 4ibd.307;Fraser,
The Rationale of the Rule against Perpetuities (1922) 6 ibid. 560; Fraser, The Rules
against Restraints on Alienation, and against Suspension of the Absolute Power of
Alienation in Minnesota (1924) 8 ibid. 185, 295; (1925) 9 ibid. 314; Trottman,
Perpetuities under the Wisconsin Statutes (1922) 2 Wis. L. REV. 14; Rundell, Per-
petuities in Personal Property in Wisconsin (1926) 4 Wis. L. REV. I.
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I. THE STATUTORY SYSTEM OF TRUSTS
Purposes for which trusts may be created. Only four classes of
trusts of real property were authorized by section 55 of the New
York Revised Statutes.5 The purposes for which trusts of real
property might be created were:
-"i. to sell lands forithe benefit-of creditors: 2. to-sell, mort-
gage or lease lands, for the benefit of legatees, or for the purpose
of satisfying any charge thereon: 3. to receive the rents and profits
of lands, and apply them to the use6 of any person, during the
life of such person, or for any shorter term, subject to the rules
prescribed in the first Article of this title: 4. to receive the rents
and profits of lands, and to accumulate the same, for the purposes
and within the limits prescribed in the first Article of this title."
After the point had been in dispute some twenty years, it was settled
in Leggett v. Perkins7 that a trust could be created under the third
subdivision of section 55, to receive the rents and profits of lands
and pay them over to designated beneficiaries. The argument of the
court on this point is instructive and explains the theory underlying
section 55 :8
"The statute in reference to express trusts is merely permissive.
It creates nothing. We might infer from the argument addressed
to us, that the legislature had in the first instance annulled all
trusts, and then proceeded to a new creation. It is more correct
to say that they abolished all that they have not recognized as
existing. The trusts preserved have their foundation in the
common law, and their effect is to be determined by the appli-
cation of common law principles.
"The creation of the trust may direct specifically the perform-
ance of those things, which the trustee, . . might himself
perform in the lawful execution of the trust, if no specific di-
rections were given."
The court also held that trusts under this subdivision were not
limited to married women, infants and incompetents, but might be
5For convenience and brevity references to the Revised Statutes will give only
the section (e. g., R. S. § 55). Unless otherwise indicated, all such references are
to Chapter I of Title II of Part II. Chapter I contains the Article on Estates
and The Alienation thereof, the Article on Uses and Trusts, and the Article on
Powers, and the sections are numbered serially throughout. Section 55 is now
embodied in section 96 of the Real Property Law (L. 1909 c. 52), hereinafter
referred to as R. P. L., simply.
6The original section read "education and support, or either," changed to
"use" by L. 1830, C. 320, § 1O.
72 N. Y. 297 (1849). Cf. Gott v. Cook, 7 Paige, 521, 539 (1839), aff'd, 24
Wend. 641. It is not necessary to state the purpose of the trust in the language
of the statute-Venon v. Vernon, 53 N. Y. 351 (1873).
8At p. 307.
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for "any person." After sixty years it was settled that a trust
might be created under subdivision three for the payment of annuities
out of rents and profits of lands,9 and that the interest of such
annuitant was inalienable under section 63.10
The attempt to create an unauthorized trust may result in the creation
of a power. Trusts of real property may not be created for purposes
other than those authorized in section 55.11 If a grantor or testator
attempts to create a trust for a purpose not authorized, and if the
trustee can accomplish the object intended by means of a power,
then legal title will vest in the beneficiary named or remain in the
settlor,12 and the trustee will get only a power. In Manice v.
Manice,14 where a testator devised his residuary real and personal
property to executors in trust to receive income, rents and profits,
and apply them during the life of his widow, then directed them to
cause the estate to be appraised, to sell and divide into shares,without
expressly giving the trustees any right to receive the rents and
profits, the court said:
"The trusts to appraise, divide and convey the shares are not
authorized by the statute, but are proper subjects of a power,
and are not void because the testator has attempted to put
them in the form of trusts."
So also in Morse v. Morse'5 it was said that:
"Authority given to an executor to sell lands, unless accom-
panied with a right to receive the rents and profits, vests no
estate in the executor, but the lands descend to the heirs or
pass to the devisees of the testator, subject to the execution of
the power."
A devise of a farm and personal property to trustees, in trust, to
permit the widow to occupy the farm and have possession of the
stock for her life, then to sell and convert into money, and invest, and
after paying annuities to divide the residue on certain trusts, etc.,
OCoclrane v. Schell, i4o N. Y. 516, 35 N. E. 971 (1895).
'OR. S. § 63, now R. P. L. § 1o3.
nDePeyster v. Clendening, 8 Paige, 295 (N. Y. i84o); Manice v. Manice,
43 N. Y. 303, 363-364 (1871); Adams v. Parry, 43 N. Y. 487 (1871), no trust to
enforce forfeiture; Heermans v. Burt, 78 N. Y. 259 (1879); Cooke v. Platt, 98
N. Y. 35 (1885); Henderson v. Henderson, 113 N. Y. i, II, 2o N. E. 814 (1889);
R. S. § 45; R. P. L. § 9I.
'2R. S. § 59; R. P. L. § 99.
13See cases cited, supra note ii; Heermans v. Robertson, 64 N. Y. 332 (1876);
Weeks v. Cornwell, IO4 N. Y. 325, 338, 1o N. E. 431 (1887); Steinhardt v.
Cunningham, 13o N. Y. 292, 29 N. E. ioo (i89I). See also R. S. § § 58, 92, IO7;
R. P. L. § § 99, 130, 147.
1443 N. Y. 303, 364 (1871).
1585 N. Y. 53 (1881).
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was held to create a legal life estate in the widow, and a power in the
trustees.18 A power may also result where a trust would render the
estate inalienable and void, though the purpose indicated is within
the scope of section 55.17 The contrary suggestion in Hawley v.
James'8 does not now represent the law. On the other hand, as
i~as said in Robert v. Corning,19
"There are many authorities tending to sustain the proposition,
that a trust will be implied in executors, when the duties imposed
are active, and render the possession of the legal estate in the
executors, convenient and reasonably necessary, although it may
not be absolutely essential to accomplish the purposes of the
will, and when such implication would not defeat, but would
sustain the dispositions of the will."
A passive trust is executed by the statute. In any case where the
trust is merely passive, and the trustee has no active duties to perform,
the statute will execute the trust and title will vest immediately in
the beneficiary. Thus, where a testator directed trustees "to permit
and suffer my son, William B. Slocum, to have, receive and take the
rents, issues and profits thereof for the term of his natural life; and
after his decease, I give, devise and bequeath the same part or share
to the heirs at law of my said son," it was held that the son took a
legal life estate.0 So also a conveyance of real property to E. A. R.
"in trust for his wife Mary" was passive only, and the title passed
absolutely to the wife.2 Many other cases might be cited for the
same proposition,2 but it will be sufficient to mention one other,23
16DePeyster v. Clendening, supra note i I.
17Downing v. Marshall, 23 N. Y. 366, 377-380 (1861); Post v. Hover, 33 N. Y.
593, 6oi (1865).
1816 Wend. 61 (N. Y. 1836). See the opinion of Bronson, J., at p. 174-5.
1989 N. Y. 225, 237 (1882). Cf. Heermans v. Burt, supra note ii; Fargo v.
Squiers, 154 N. Y. 250, 259, 48 N. E. 509 (1897); R. S. § 56; R. P. L. § 97.
2
°Verdin v. Slocum, 71 N. Y. 345 (1877). But cf. Kiah v. Greiner, 56 N. Y.
220 (1874), where the testator directed property to be "used and held for support,
education," etc., of the beneficiary, and a trust was created. See R. S. § 47;
R. P. L. § 92.
2 1Matter of Gawne, 82 App. Div. 374, 81 N. Y. Supp. 861 (I9O3).
nSee especially Denison v. Denison, 185 N. Y. 438, 443, 78 N. E. 162 (19o6),
where Cullen, Ch. J., said: "While the executors are directed to hold the shares
of the beneficiaries who took immediately on the death of the testator during
their respective lives, the provision for the issue of the life tenant is unlimited
and unqualified, 'in trust for his, her or their child. . . heirs, her or their executors,
administrators and assigns.' Surely the testator... never contemplated the
continuance of a trust for the benefit of the assignee of the children." See also
Sinnott v. McLaughlin, 198 App. Div. 630, 19o N. Y. Supp. 828 (1921); Murphey
v. Cook, ii S. D. 47, 51, 75 N. W. 387 (1898).23Wendt v. Walsh, 164 N. Y. 154, 58 N. B. 2 (19oo). Cf. Ullman v. Cameron,
186 N. Y. 339, 78 N. E. zo74 (19o6).
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where lands were granted in trust for a designated person, his heirs
and assigns, rents and profits to be paid to them, and the trustee
promised to convey to the cestui que trust, his heirs and assigns upon
demand. This was held to create a mere naked trust, executed by
the statute, and the fee vested in the cestui que trust. Similarly, a
provision for annuities or legacies may be given effect to as an
equitable charge, and the beneficiary will take the estate subject
to the charge.2
Trusts of personal property. The legislature has not, however,
limited the purposes for which personal property trusts may be
created in New York, and so they may be created for any lawful
purpose, without writing, and the delivery of the property is sufficient
to pass title to the trustee.25 Furthermore, as was said in Underwood
v. Curtis:
1
2ABuchanan v. Little, 154 N. Y. 147, 47 N. E. 970 (1897); Orr v. Orr, 147 App.
Div. 753, 133 N. Y. Supp. 48 (I91i), aff'd, 212 N. Y. 615, lO6 N. E. 1032, pay-
ments to widow a charge; Matter of Seif, 212 App. Div. 558, 2o9 N. Y. Supp.
341 (1925), legacies held charge. A charge does not suspend the power of aliena-
tion.
uDay v. Roth, 18 N. Y. 448 (1858); Gilman v. McArdle, 99 N. Y. 451, 2 N. E.
464 (1885), upholding a trust for the support of A and her husband for life, and
to defray funeral expenses, erect a monument and provide for masses; Hirsch v.
Auer, 146 N. Y. 13, 4o N. E. 397 (1895), upholding oral trust to collect insurance
policy, pay funeral expenses and divide surplus between two children; Matter of
Wilkin, 183 N. Y. 104, 75 N. E. 11o5 (igo5), trust to pay income to son, and
principal also in discretion of trustee; Carrier v. Carrier, 226 N. Y. 114, 123 N. E.
135 (1919), trust for support of family and maintenance of family establishment.
See also Matter of Carpenter, 131 N. Y. 86, 29 N. E. 1005 (1892); Von Hesse v.
MacKaye, 136 N. Y. 114, 32 N. E. 615 (1892); Tabernacle Church v. Fifth Ave.
Ch., 6o App. Div. 327, 7o N. Y. Supp. 18i (I9OI), aff'd, 172 N. Y. 598, 64 N. E.
1126; Brown v. Spohr, 87 App. Div. 522, 84 N. Y. Supp. 995 (1903); Mersereau v.
Bennett, 124 App. Div. 413, io8 N. Y. Supp. 868 (19o8); Devoe v. Lutz, 133
App. Div. 356, 117 N.Y. Supp. 339 (19o9); Backhaus v. Backhaus, 7o Wis. 518,
36 N. W. 265 (i888).
2'127 N. Y. 523, 532, 28 N. E. 585 (1891), by Parker, J. See also Gott v. Cook,
7 Paige, 521 (N. Y. 1839), aff'd, on this point, 24 Wend. 64o, 659-661; White v.
Howard, 46 N. Y. -I44 (1871); Lent v. Howard, 89 N. Y. 169 (1882); Hobson v.
Hale, 95 N. Y. 588 (1884); Russell v. Hilton, 80 App. Div. 178, 8o N. Y. Supp.
563 (1903), aff'd, 175 N, Y. 525, 67 N. E. 1O89. Cf. Salisbury v. Slade, 16o
N. Y. 278, 288, 54 N. E. 741 (I899), where equitable conversion resulted from an
"implied, and imperative power of sale."
In Minnesota and Wisconsin, if the trustee may in his discretion convert to
personal property, the trust is treated as a trust of personal property-In re
Tower's Estate, 49 Minn. 371, 52 N. W. 27 (1892); Becker v. Chester, 115 Wis.
go, 91 N. W. 87, 650 (19o2). For discussion of the situation in Minn. see Fraser,
op. cit. supra note 4, (1925) 9 MINN. L. REV. 314, 327 et seg. Michigan requires
a "power .and mandate" in the trustee-Grand Rapids Tr. Co. v. Herbst, 220
Mich. 321, 19o N. W. 250 (1922); Michigan Tr. Co. v. Baker, 226 Mich. 72, 196
N. W. 976 (1924).
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"It has long been the established rule that where executors
are clothed with the power and duty to sell a testator's real
estate and distribute the proceeds in the manner provided by
the will that the real estate will be deemed converted into
personalty...
"It is necessary, of course, that the direction to convert be
positive and explicit irrespective of all contingencies and inde-
pendent of all discretion on the part of the donee of the power."
The determination of the time for the conversion depends upon the
intention of the testator, but it usually takes place at the death of
the testator unless the time of sale is postponed. 27 If, by the pro-
visions of the will or instrument creating the trust, an equitable
conversion of real property into personal property has been ac-
complished, the trust will be treated as a trust of personal property.
This point was clearly expressed by the court in Russell v. Hilton28
as follows:
"We concur with the court below that 'since the will worked
an immediate equitable conversion of all the testator's real estate
into personal property, the trusts set up by the will are to be
considered as trusts of personal property, which are not fettered
by the limitations prescribed for trusts of real estate, but may
be created for any purpose not unlawful, subject only to the
law against perpetuities. (Cochrane v. Schell, 14o N. Y. 516,
534.)'"
Trusts for charitable purposes. In respect of trusts which may be
created under the New York statutes, it remains to consider whether
trusts for charitable purposes may be created, and if so, whether such
trusts are subject to the rules against suspension of the power of
alienation. After a long period of uncertainty the New York statutes
were held not to authorize charitable trusts of real or personal
property,29 for three reasons: First, because, prior to the adoption
27Underwood v. Curtis, supra note 26, at 533.
28Supra note 26, at 187.
29Levy v. Levy, 33 N. Y. 97 (1865); Adams v. Perry, 43 N. Y. 487 (1871);
Holmes v. Mead, 52 N. Y. 332 (1873); Cottman v. Grace, 112 N. Y. 299, 19
N. E. 839 (1889); Fosdick v. Town of Hempstead, 125 N. Y. 581, 26 N. E. 8oi
(i89i); Tilden v. Green, x3O N. Y. 29, 28 N. E. 88o (i891); Murray v. Miller,
178 N. Y. 316, 7o N. E. 870 (I9O4). Accord, under substantially the same
statutes: Hopkins v. Crossley, 132 Mich. 612, 96 N. W. 499 (I903); Shanahan
v. Kelly, 88 Minn. 202, 92 N. W. 948 (I9O3).
Wisconsin held charitable trusts of personal property valid and not subject to
the rule against suspension of the power of alienation. Dodge v. Williams, 46
Wis. 70, I N. W. 92, 50 N. W. IO3 (1879). It was held in Harrington v. Pier,
1o5 Wis. 485, 82 N. W. 345 (I9OO), that charitable trusts of real property were
valid, but in Danforth v. Oshkosh, 119 Wis. 262, 97 N. W. 258 (r9o3), the rule
against suspending the power of alienation was applied to them. They were
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of the Revised Statutes, the English Statute of Charitable Uses 0
was rejected in New York,3 and a certain definite beneficiary was
deemed essential to the creation of a valid trust;12 Second, because
as to real property, trusts for charity were not within the permitted
trust purposes of section 55; and Third, because trusts for indefinite
beneficiaries were destroyed by the rule against suspension of the
power of alienation, in that such trusts would suspend the power of
alienation for a longer period than that permitted by law." It was
always lawful, however, to make a gift directly to a charitable corpo-
ration for purposes within the scope of its charter," and a valid gift
could be made to a charitable corporation to be formed within the
period of two lives in being at the death of the testator," though such
a gift was not permitted if the corporation was only to be organized
in the discretion of the executors or of the legislature." No accumu-
lation, however, was permitted for a charity.37 In 1893, as a result
excepted from the operation of the rule by L. I905, c. 511 (now Wis. St., 1925,
§ 230. 15). See Maxcy v. Oshkosh, 144 Wis. 238, 275, 128 N. W. 899, 1136 (191o).
For the common law of charitable trusts, see CHALLIS, REAL PROPERTY (3d
ed. 1911) 194; GRAY, op. cit. supra note 2, c. XVIII and Appx. A; MARSDEN,
RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (1883) 24, 295.
Private trusts of indefinite duration, for uncertain beneficiaries, are void.
Kennedy v. Kennedy, [1914] A. C. 215; In re Bartlett, 163 Mass. 509, 40 N. E.
899 (1895); Murray v. Miller, 178 N. Y. 316, 70 N. E. 870 (1904); Kelly v.
Nichols, 17 R. I. 3o6, 21 At1. 9o6 (i89i). See GRAY, op. cit. supra note 2, § 898.
10( 16oi) 43 Eliz. C. 4.31L. 1788, c. 46; Beekman v. Bonsor, 23 N. Y. 298, 307 (1861).
2See last par. of note 29.31See first par. of note 29.
34Williams v. Williams, 8 N. Y. 525 (1853), donor may prescribe use within
permitted corporate purposes; Wetmore v. Parker, 52 N. Y. 450 (1873); Driscoll v.
Hewlett, 198 N. Y. 297, 91 N. E. 784 (191o); Sherman v. Richmond Hose Co.,
23o N. Y. 462, 13o N. E. 613 (1921), fund applied cy pres on dissolution of com-
pany. See also on cy pres, Trustees of Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Carmody, 211
N. Y. 286, 105 N. E. 543 (I914).
35Shipman v. Rollins, 98 N. Y. 311 (1885); Driscoll v. Hewlett, 198 N. Y. 297,
91 N. E. 784 (10io); Sherman v. Richmond Hose Co., supra note 34; Matter of
Potts, 205 App. Div. I47, 199 N. Y. Supp. 880 (1923), aff'd, 236 N. Y. 658, 142
N. E. 323, direction to form corporation as soon as possible; Maynard v. Farmers'
L. & T. Co., 208 App. Div. 112, 203 N. Y. Supp. 83 (1924), aff'd, 238 N. Y.
592, 144 N. E. 905.
aBooth v. B&ptist Ch., 126 N. Y. 215,28 N. E. 238 (1891); People v. Simonson,
126 N. Y. 299, 27 N. E. 380 (1891).
37St. John v. Andrews Inst., 191 N. Y. 254, 83 N. E. 98I (igo8). But accumu-
lations are now permitted in certain cases by statute. See R. P. L. § 61; P. P. L.
§ 16.
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of the decision in Tilden v. Green,'8 a statute was enacted 9 permitting
charitable trusts of real and personal property for uncertain bene-
ficiaries, and this has been construed as abrogating the rule against
suspension of the power of alienation as to such trusts.40
Personal property trust to be administered in another jurisdiction.
Where the designated trustee of a personal property trust is a
corporation created by and located in another state; and the fund is
to be there held and administered, and the trust is legal under the
laws of the foreign state the courts of New York will transmit the
fund to the foreign jurisdiction to be held on the trusts indicated,
even though such trusts would be void as suspending the power of
alienation in New York.41 As has been said,42 "it is no part of the
policy of the state of New York to interdict perpetuities or gifts
in mortmain in Pennsylvania or California." The same result was
reached in a case where realty was directed to be converted into
personal property, to be paid over to trustees in Scotland for a
charitable use which would have been void in New York but was
authorized in Scotland. 4 Where a testator domiciled in a foreign
jurisdiction has disposed of real and personal property located in
New York on trusts which are void in New York, the New York court
will not aid in enforcing the real property trust but will transmit the
personal property to the state where the testator died domiciled,
to be there administered in accordance with the laws of the foreign
jurisdiction.4
Trusts for the purpose of accumulations. Under the Revised
Statutes45 accumulations of the rents and profits of land, or the
income of personal property, are permitted only "during minority
and for the benefit of the minor during whose minority the accumu-
'BSupra note 28.
19L. 1893, c. 7O1; now R. P. L. § II3, and P. P. L. § 12. See also R. P. L.
§ § 4, ii5; P. P. L., § § x3, I4. Similar statutes have been enacted in Michigan
and Wisconsin. For these and the Minnesota statutes, see BOGERT, TRUSTS
(1921) 198.
4°Allen v. Stevens, I6I N. Y. 122, 55 N. E. 568 (1899). Matter of Griffin, x67
N. Y. 71, 8I, 6o N. E. 284 (I9oI), on when absolute gift to charity intended and
when trust; Matter of MacDowell, 217 N. Y. 454, 112 N. E. 177 (1916), preference
to certain relatives and friends does not prevent trust from being charitable.
'Robb v. W. & J. Coll., 185 N. Y. 485, 78 N. E. 359 (19o6).
42Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 43 N. Y. 424, 432 (1871).43Hope v. Brewer, 136 N. Y. 126, 32 N. E. 558 (1892).
"
4Knox v. Jones, 47 N. Y. 389 (1872); Despard v. Churchill, 53 N. Y. 192
(1873); Dammert v. Osborn, 14o N. Y. 3o, 35 N. E. 407 (1893). Cf. Hobson v.
Hale, 95 N. Y. 588 (1884).
45§ § 37, 38, now R. P. L. § 61.
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lation is directed, '4 and such accumulation must be for the sole
benefit of the infant, and must be paid to him absolutely upon -his
majority.47 The minor for whose benefit the accumulation is directed
need not, however, be in esse at the death of the testator, but the
accumulation cannot begin before the birth of the infant for whose
benefit it is directed, and it must begin within the period permitted
for suspension of the absolute ownership of personal property and
the power of alienation of real property, respectively. These questions
were involved in the leading case of Manice v. Manice,48 where Rapallo,
J., said:
"Neither do the provisions authorizing accumulations require
that the minor for whose benefit the accumulation is to be made
should be in being at the death of the testator, unless the ac-
cumulation is to commence at his [the testator's] death. If it is
to commence at a subsequent period, the beneficiary must be in
being at the time of the commencement of the accumulation,
otherwise it cannot be said to commence during the minority of
the person for whose benefit it is directed. An accumulation for
an unborn child, to commence after the birth of the child, and to
- terminate with his minority, is lawful, provided that it is also to
commence within the time permitted for the vesting of future
estates, that is to say, on the expiration of two lives in being;
but an accumulation for the benefit of an unborn child, to com-
mence before his birth,'is not permitted under any circumstances.
.... It is also requisite that the accumulation be for the benefit
of the minor during whose minority it is to commence and
continue."
So an accumulation for the purpose of paying a mortgage is un-
authorized,49 as is also an accumulation during the life of a minor,
but partly or wholly for the benefit of others, 0 and an accumulation
for charity,51 and a direction to add income to the capital of a busi-
ness.62 The result of an unauthorized accumulation is not, however,
4sPray v. Hegeman, 92 N. Y. 5o8, 5i5 (I883); Hawley v. James, supra note 18;
Hascall v. King, 162 N. Y. 134, 56 N. E. 515 (igoo). The real property rule as
to accumulation is not applied to personal property in Michigan-Toms v.
Williams, 4I Mich. 552, 562 (1879).
47Pray v. Hegeman, supra note 46.
4843 N. Y. 303, 376 (87).
'
9Hascall v. King, supra note 46; Mann-Vynne v. Equitable Tr. Co., 2o App.
Div. 149, 194 N. Y. Supp. 50 (1922); Guaranty Tr. Co. v. Halsted, 245 N. Y.
447 (1927).
50Kilpatrick v. Johnson, I5 N. Y. 322 (1857); Pray v. Hegeman, supra note 46;
U. S Trust Co. v. Sober, 178 N. Y. 442, 7o N. E. 970 (1904).
5ISt. John v. Andrews Inst., supra note 37. Certain accumulations for charity
are now permitted by special statutes. See R. P. L. § 6I; P. P. L. § x6.
62Thorn v. De Breteujl, 179 N.Y. 64, 7 N.E. 47o (19o4). As to whether an
insurance trust provides for an illegal accumulation, see Bogert, Funded Insurance
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to destroy the estate or interest created, but the funds so accumulated
must be paid immediately and directly to "the person presumptively
entitled to the next eventual estate," 53 and where an accumulation
is directed for the benefit of an infant until he reach 25 years,
only the portion after he reaches 21 is cut off.M
II. INCIDENTS OF AUTHORIZED TRUSTS OF REAL OR
PERSONAL PROPERTY
Estate of the trustee. By virtue of the provisions of sections 6o,
6i and 62 of the Revised Statutes,s the trustee of every express
trust acquires the whole estate, in law and equity. The cestui que
trust takes no estate or interest in the lands, but only a personal right
to enforce performance of the trust in equity.!' The statute does
not mean, however, that every trustee of an express trust takes an
absolute and indefeasible fee in the premises, but only such estate
as is necessary for the execution of the trust in question.57 It is
competent for the testator to dispose of the remainder after the
determination of the trust, or to direct to whom lands shall pass on
Trusts and the Rule against Accumulations (1924) 9 CORNFLL LAW QUARTERLY
113; and L. X927, C. 384.
3Kilpatrick v. Johnson, supra note 50; St. John v. Andrews Inst., supra note 37;
statutes, supra note 45.
"Thom v. De Breteuil, supra note 52.
55Now R. P. L. § § ioo, iOI, x02.
MMarx v. McGlynn, 88 N. Y. 357, 376 (1882), devise to trustees for alien
cestui gue trust valid; Van Cott v. Prentice, io4 N. Y. 45, 52, 1o N.E. 257 (1887).
57
"Although the legal estate is in the trustee, he but possesses a naked right,
which is to be exercised, not for his own benefit, but for that of another. His
estate is commensurate with the trust duties... The whole beneficial proprietor-
ship, or interest, is in the cestui que trust, for whom he holds the estate and who
has the right to enforce the performance of the trust." Metcalfe v. Union Tr.
Co., i8I N Y. 39, 44, 73 N. E. 498 (x9o5), holding statute constitutional which
permitted destruction of trust in certain cases, and not a taking of trustee's
property without due process.
See also Hawley v. James, supra note z8, at 148; Genet v. Hunt, 113 N. Y.
x58, 169, 21 N. E. 91 (1889), estate of trustee limited to trust term; Matter of
Estate of Straut, 126 N. Y. 20X, 27 N. E. 259 (1891), beneficiary not a necessary
party to an action by trustee against third party; Cochrane v. Schell, supra
note 9, at 536; Losey v. Stanley, 147 N. Y. 560, 567, 42 N. E. 8 (1895), legal estate
in remainder following trust is valid; Kernochan v. Marshall, x65 N. Y. 472,
59 N. E. 293 (1goz), no trust where creator directed that legal estate be in bene-
ficiary; Doscher v. Wyckoff, 132 App. Div. 139, 143, ii6 N. Y. Supp. 389 (19o3),
trustee has "not every possible interest in the land, but the estate necessary to
make the trust effective"; Brearley School v. Ward, 20 N. Y. 358, 371, 94 N. E.
ooi (i91i). statute taking ten per cent. of income of trust for creditors is valid
against trustee.
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failure or invalidity of the trust.58 So a trustee to collect rents and
profits for the life of a beneficiary will take only an estate for the
life of such beneficiary, and the reversion or remainder will vest in
the persons entitled thereto by the provisions of the deed of trust or
the will." But a trustee to sell for the benefit of creditors or legatees,
or with imperative power of sale, will take the whole estate to enable
him to convey an absolute fee.6" There is no inconsistency in a trust
which vests the estate in the trustee for the life of a designated
cestui que trust, and a power in the same trustee to dispose of the
remainder.6 The tendency of the cases has been to apply the same
principles to trusts of personal property, as to which, however, even
at common law the trustee with power to sell and invest or to ex-
change, was held to have the whole estate or interest in the property. 2
As was said in a leading case,6
"The statute of uses and trusts declares this to be so in respect
of lands (i R. S. p. 729, sec. 6o), and as to money or personal
property it is so by the rules of the common law."
The same idea was well expressed in Rhodes v. Caswell," as follows:
58Belmont v. O'Brien, 12 N. Y. 405 (1885); Brown v. Richter, 25 App. Div.
239, 243-4, 49 N. Y. Supp. 368 (x898); Scott v. West, 63 Wis. 529, 563,24 N. W.
161, 25 N. W. I8 (1885).
59Embury v. Sheldon, 68 N. Y. 227, 234 (1877); Goebel v. Wolf, II3 N. Y.
405, 21 N. E. 388 (1889), beneficiaries for life had vested remainder in fee;
Townshend v. Frommer, 125 N. Y. 446, 455, 26 N. E. 805 (I89i); Matter of
Tienken, 131 N. Y. 391, 30 N. E. io9 (1892), settled that "trustee takes a legal
estate commensurate with the equitable estate, and that ... there may be
remainders and future estates, or powers of sale adequate to terminate the trust;"
Knowlton v. Atkins, 134 N. Y. 313, 31 N. E. 941 (1892); Locke v. Farmers'
L. & T. Co., I4O N. Y. i35, 146, 35 N. E. 578 (1893); Matter of Brown, 154 N. Y.
313, 325, 48 N. E. 537 (1897); Bergmann v. Lord, 194 N.Y. 70, 86 N. E. 828
(1909), remainder following trust vested and subject to action by creditors;
Toms v. Williams, supra note 46, at 566, remainder after trust vested without
conveyance by trustee.60Briggs v. Davis, 21 N. Y. 574 (i86o), trust for sale, subsequent grantee from
settlor gets no right to redeem land; Duvall v. English, etc., 53 N. Y. 50o (1873);
Brennan v. Willson, 71 N.Y. 5o2 (1877); Bennett v. Garlock, 79-N. Y. 3o2 (i88o),
where trustees with power and duty to sell barred by adverse possession, con-
tingent remainders barred; People ex rel. Short v. Bacon, 99 N. Y. 275, 279,
2 N. E. 4 (1885), trustee to sell for creditors gets perfect and exclusive estate;
Salisbury v. Slade, I6o N. Y. 278, 54 N. E. 741 (1899), where trust for conversion,
remaindermen not entitled to possession of land on determination of precedent
estates, and cannot reach realty.
6ICrooke v. County of Kings, 97 N. Y. 421, 434 (1884).
62Brown v. Richter, supra note 58; Rhodes v. Caswell, 4 App. Div. 229, 234,
58 N. Y. Supp. 470 (1899).
6 Gilman v. Reddington, 24 N. Y. 9 (i86i).
64Supra note 62, at 234.
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" 'If, however, the subject matter of the gift to trustees is
personal estate, the whole legal interest will vest in them without
words of limitation. They may generally dispose of personal
estate absolutely, being compelled to account for it' (Perry
Trusts, sec. 318). . . assuming that a trust may be created in
personalty in which the estate of the trustee would be confined
to the duration of the trust, we think it can only be so created
in a specific chattel or chose in action, which may endure beyond
the trust term. Where the trust estate is of the character of
that given by this testator, a fund that is to be invested and
necessarily reinvested, the securities representing which the
trustee may collect or dispose of, we think the doctrine laid
down by Mr. Perry must obtain... In trusts of this character
... the whole title to the trust fund is in the trustee, and...
all the remaindermen have is a right to an account."
By section 6o the revisers seem to have intended to abolish the
technical rules regarding legal and equitable estates, during the
continance of a valid express trust. Unfortunately, in 1896 the
wording of section 6o was amended to provide that the trustee takes
the "legal estate," and the cestui que trust shall not take any "legal
estate."
Interest of cestui que trust inalienable. Exceptions. By section
6366 the interest of the cestui que trust in trusts for the receipt of rents
and profits of lands was expressly made inalienable, but the rights
and interest of a cestui que trust for receipt of a sum in gross was
expressly made assignable. This section' has been applied ruthlessly
by the courts so that the beneficiary of a trust for the receipt of
rents and profits of lands, or the income of personal property, is
unable by any conveyance, assignment or release, voluntarily or
involuntarily, to dispose of his interest in the rents and profits or
income of the trust.67 Nor can that result be accomplished by the
application of doctrines of laches, waiver, or estoppel.68 No dis-
tinction has been made between trusts of personal property and those
involving real property. Long before a statute was enacted expressly
making the interest of the beneficiary of a personal property trust
inalienable, his interest was held inalienable under the real property
6
'Ths change does not seem to have been considered by the courts, and was
probably not intended to change the meaning of the original section (6o). See
Vol. IV, REPORT OF THE BOARD OF STATUTORY CONSOLmATION (1909) p. 4900.
6R. S. § 63. Cf.R.P.L.§io3;P.P.L.§z5.
67Douglas v. Cruger, 8o N. Y. 15, i8 (i88o); Tiers v. Tiers, 98 N. Y. 568 (x885);
Slater v. Slater, 114 App. Div. i6o, 99 N. Y. Supp. 564 (x9o6), aff'd, 188 N. Y.
633, 81 N. E. 1176; Central Tr. Co. v. Gaffney, 157 App. Div. 5oi, 5o6, 142 N. Y.
Supp. 902 (1913), aff'd, 215 N. Y. 74o IO9 N. E. IO69.
68Matter of Wentworth 23o N. Y. 176, 129 N. E. 646 (1920).
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section. 9 This matter will be discussed in some detail below.
Since 1897 the Personal Property Law has contained an express
provision which clearly brings the law as to personal property into
line with section 63 .70 This section has been applied not only to
trusts where the trustee was directed to apply the rents and profits
to the use of the cestui qu trust, and where the cestui que trust was
an infant or married woman or might be incompetent to manage
his own affairs, but also to trusts where the trustee was directed to
pay over the rents and profits to a competent cestui quo trust.7
The creator of the trust cannot by any direction or permission confer
upon the cestui quo trust the power of alienating his interest.7 2 Nor
can the Supreme Court order or consent to a termination of the trust
or a conveyance by the cestui que trust.73 Nor can the creditors of
a cestui qu trust of such a trust reach his interest 4 except in accor-
dancewith the provisions of specialstatuteswhich enable such creditors
to reach the surplus rents and profits over and above such as are
necessary for the support and maintenance of the cestui quo trust,75
and that maintenance and support is necessary to which the cestui
que trust has been accustomed by reason of prior luxurious surround-
6
"Hallettv. Thompson, 5 Paige, 583 (N.Y. 1836), semble; Hone v. Van Schaick,
7 Paige, 221 (1838), aff'd, 20 Wend. 564; Everitt v. Everitt, 29 N. Y. 39 (1864);
Graff v. Bonnett, 3I N. Y. 9 (1865); Tiers v. Tiers, supra note 67; Stringer v.
Young, I91 N. Y. 157, 164-5, 83-N. E. 690 (i9O8), trust created in 1879.70Personal Property Law of 1897, § 3; L. 1903, c. 87, § 2; L. 1911, C. 327;
P. P. L., § 15; R. S. § 63 is now § 1o3, R. P. L.
nLeggett v. Perkins, supra note 7; Cochrane v. Schell, supra note 9, at 532;
Matter of Ungrich, 2oi N. Y. 415, 94 N. E. 999 (1911).
"Crooke v. County of Kings, supra note 61, semblk; Farmers L. & T. Co. v.
Kip, x92 N. Y. 266, 279, 85 N. E. 59 (x9o8), life beneficiary had power to ap-
point remainder by deed or will, but held not equivalent to absolute ownership.
But the legislature can authorize the beneficiary to convey. Leggett v. Hunter,
i9 N. Y. 445, 460-3 (1859); Brearley School v. Ward, supra note 57, at 369.
"Douglas v. Cruger, supra note 67; Cuthbert v. Chauvet, 136 N. Y. 326, 32
N. E. xo88 (1893), judgment by stipulation and consent of parties; Rochevot v.
Rochevot, 74 App. Div. 585, 590, 77 N. Y. Supp. 788 (i902), beneficiaries sought
by agreement a termination of the trust and discharge of trustee. But see
Matter of O'Donnell, 221 N. Y. 197, ii6 N. E. ooi (1917), Supreme Court now
authorized to act in certain cases.
7 4Campbell v. Foster, 35 N. Y. 361 (1866); Douglas v. Cruger, supra note 67;
Wetmore v. Wetmore, 149 N. Y. 520, 44 N. E. 169 (1896), wife's alimony judg-
ment not excepted; Matter of Ungrich, supra note 71, trustee with judgment
cannot seize income nor set off his judgment; Slater v. Slater, supra note 67.
But see argument in Hallett v. Thomnson, supra note 69, at 586.
7 R. S. § 57, now R. P. L. § 98; Williams v. Thorn, 7o N. Y. 270 (1877), statute
applies to both real and personal property. Trotter v. Lisman, x99 N. Y. 497,
501, 92 N. B. 1052 (19io), the creditor must first exhaust his remedy at law.
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ings or habits.78 By another statute creditors can reach ten per cent
of the income of such trusts, and apparently this remedy is in addition
to that discussed above. 77
But the courts have, with apparent reluctance, held that a legacy
of a fixed amount payable under a testamentary trust is a sum in
gross, and therefore alienable by the cestui que trust.7 8 The same is
necessarily true of the interests of the cestui que trust under trusts
of the first and second classes of section 55, since these are not trusts
for the receipt of rents and profits.7 9 Likewise, the interest of an
annuitant is alienable if it is in the nature of a sum in-gross-payable
out of-income and principal indiscriminately,. under the-third-sub-
division of section 55,80 or if provided for under the second subdi-
vision,81 or if in the nature of an equitable charge,, but not if payable
out of and dependent upon the receipt of income and profits.Y
Furthermore, it has been held that where an accumulation of the
income of property is directed, or results incidentally, in violation
of the statute which permits accumulations only during the minority
of an infant and for the benefit of the infant during whose minority
the accumulation was made, and consequently such accumulation
is payable to the "person presumptively entitled to the next eventual
estate," this interest does not fall within the purview of section 63
and is alienable.8 It is worth while to quote the language of Whitney,
J., in the New York Supreme Court, Special Term, in a case so
holding:8
"Williams v. Thorn, supra note 75, at 278; Schuler v. Post, x8 App. Div. 374,
46 N. Y. Supp. IS (1897). See also Magner v, Crooks, I39 Calif. 640, 73 Pac.
585 (1903).
"Brearley Schoolv. Ward, supra note 57, construing § 1391 C. C. P., as amended
by L. 1908, C. 148, and holding it applicable to pre-existing trust.
"Radley v. Kuhn, 97 N. Y. 26, 31 (1884); Matter of Trumble, ig9 N. Y. 454,
92 N. E. IO73 (19o), sum in gross payable in installments. See also Matter of
Bloodgood, 184 App. Div. 798, 172 N. Y. Supp. 5o9 (1918), beneficiary to receive
comfortable income and support can alienate.
79Radley v. Kuhn, supra note 78; Hascall v. King, supra note 46, at 146.
8 Wells v. Squires, 117 App. Div. 5o2, io2 N. Y. Supp. 597 (19o7), aff'd, 191
N. Y. 529, 84 N. E. 1122.
8Clark v. Clark, I47 N. Y. 639, 42 N. E. 275 (1895); Buchanan v. Little,
supra note 24; Peoples Trust Co. v. Flynn, 188 N. Y. 385, 80 N. E. Io98 (1907).
82Cases cited supra notes 80 and 8t, and Dunham v. Deraismes, 165 N. Y. 65,
58 N. E. 789 (i9oo); Central Trust Co. v. Falck, 177 App. Div. 501, 164 N. Y.
Supp. 473 (1917), aff'd, 223 N. Y. 705, 12o N. E. 859.
8Cochrane v. Schell, supra note 9; Clute v. Bool, 8 Paige, 83, 85 (N. Y. 184o).
uLivingston v. Tucker, 107 N. Y. 549, 552, 14 N. E. 443 (1882), accumulation
resulting from sale ordered by court.
$'Ransom v. Ransom, 70 Misc. 30, 36, 127 N. Y. Supp. 1027 (igo). The
present wording of R. P. L. § 1o3 and P. P. L. § 1s, would seem to limit inalien-
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"Beneficiaries may alienate except so far as the statute pro-
hibits... Literally read, the statute as it existed at the date of
the Bell will prohibited any assignment (i R. S. 730, sec. 63),
but I do not think that a literal reading is necessary since the
object of the provision was merely to protect the persons who
were the object of the grantor's or testator's bounty until the next
eventual estate falls in. Meanwhile the income is derived from
a statute analogous to the Statute of Distribution.
"The purview of the nonassignability clause should not be
extended, for in its application to this class of trusts it extends a
class of extravagence-free and luxury-free, but judgment-proof
and execution-proof, incomes, that, in the case of beneficiaries
sui juris, are contrary to the present views of the public policy
in this state ...are disapproved by high authority elsewhere
(Gray on Restraint on the Alienation of Property [2d ed.]
Appendix iA), and quite probably were never intended by the
revisers who drew or the legislature which adopted the statute
whose protection this lady seeks."
It was finally decided by a divided court that the interest of a
beneficiary of a trust for the receipt of rents and profits, who was
himself the settlor of the trust, could be reached by his creditors,
even though the trust was created while the settlor was solvent,
and the claims of his creditors arose thereafter.86 And "it necessarily
follows from that decision (Schenck v. Barnes, 156 N. Y. 3P6) that
the prohibition against the alienation by a life beneficiary of rents,
issues and profits, contained in section 63 of article 2 of title 2 of
chapter i of part 2 of the Revised Statutes, does not apply where the
life beneficiary is the settlor of the trust; and it necessarily follows
that it was competent for the settlor of the trust to assign her interest
in the income, as she did in the case at bar, by giving a mortgage
thereon." 87  And when the cestui que trust could demand the corpus
at any time his creditors could also reach it,"' and the remainder
after a valid trust is alienable by the owner thereof and can be
ability of the beneficiaries' interest to cases where the income or rents and profits
are to be applied to his use, thereby excluding trusts for accumulation. But see
Vol. IV, REPORT OF THE BOARD OF STATUTORY CONSOLIDATION (1909) p. 4900.
8 Schenck v. Barnes, 156 N. Y. 316, So N. E. 967 (1898).
8 Newton v. Hunt, 134 App. Div. 325, 330, 19 N.Y. Supp. 3 (19o9), af'd, 201
N. Y. 599, 95 N. E. 1134.
8 8Where the beneficiary has absolute control of the fund, or an absolute right
to reach the corpus, his creditors can reach both income and corpus, whether
beneficiary was also settlor or not. Hallett v. Thompson, supra note 74, personal
property, express provision against alienation; Wainwright v. Low, 132 N. Y. 313,
319, 3o N. E. 747 (1892), held no trust; Ullman v. Cameron, 186 N. Y. 339, 78
N. E. 1074 (igo6), personal property.
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reached by his creditors."9 It seems that an assignment by the
beneficiary of accrued income, in the form of a direction to the trustee
to pay it over to the assignee, will protect the trustee in making such
payment, the statute being directed at an assignment by way of
anticipation 0
The trustee is prohibitedfrom alienating. By section 65 of the Revised
Statutes" the trustee of a real property trust could not convey
in contravention of the trust. It is believed that this section expresses
little more than a rule of courts of equity which would be applied
to alienation by trustees even in the absence of the statute,12 with
the additionalfeature-that-by the- statute a purchaser from the
trustee cannot be a bona fide purchaser for value where the trust is
declared in the instrument vesting the estate. No corresponding
statute has been enacted with reference to trusts of personal property.
This, however, could have made little difference in the results of the
decided cases. Section 65 has been interpreted as prohibiting alien-
ation by the trustee of the particular trust property in contravention
of the trust, and also as a prohibition against terminating or destroy-
ing the trust,91 and as so construed, it has been applied to trusts of
real and personal property alike.9 It was held in Hawley v: James,95
the first case on this point to reach the Court of Errors, that the
statutory prohibition against alienation by a trustee rendered his
estate inalienable within the meaning of the statute against suspending
the power of alienation; furthermore, that the same result would
follow even though the trustee could exchange the property or sell
89Bergmann v. Lord, supra note 59; West v. Burke, 219 N.Y. 7, 113 N. E. 56I
(1916); cf. Baltes v. Union Tr. Co., I8o N. Y. 183, 72 N. E. 1OO5 (19o4).
9 Estate of Valentine, 5 Misc. 479, 26 N. Y. Supp. 716 (1893); Heise v. Wells,
211 N. Y. 1, 104 N. E. 1120 (r914), revocable power of attorney; Matter of Yard,
1i6 Misc. i9, 189 N. Y. Supp. 190 (1921), where assignment by anticipation was
upheld; Matter of Oakley, ix6 Misc. 494, 19o N. Y. Supp. 157 (1921); see also
Slater v. Slater, supra note 74, assignment to son of percentage of income void;
Seeley v. Fletcher, 63 Misc. 448, 117 N. Y. Supp. 86 (I9O9), duty of trustee to
disregard power of attorney to creditor.
Section 63 does not apply to a trust created in another state, and trustee ap-
pointed there-First Nat. Bank v. Nat. Broadway Bank, 156 N. Y. 459, 472,
51 N. E. 398 (1898).
"'Now R. P. L., § io5.
92BOGERT, TRusTs (1921) § 88.
93Douglas v. Cruger, supra note 67; Matter of Wentworth, supra note 68, and
see s. c. 190 App. Div. 829, I81 N. Y. Supp. 442.
91McPherson v. Rollins, 107 N. Y. 316, 14 N. E. 411 (1887); Cochrane v.
Schell, supra note 9, at 534, semble; Matter of Wentworth, supra note 68.
95Supra note 18, at 163.
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it and reinvest the proceeds. As was said by Chancellor Walworth
when this case was before the Court of Chancery:"
"The mere exchange of one piece of property for another, by
a trustee, under a valid power in trust, is not considered an
alienation of the estate or interest of the cestui que trust...
The rules of law ... have reference to the substance, and not
merely to the shadow. And for every substantial purpose, the
land received in exchange for that of which the testator died
seized, can be considered in no other light than as the same
estate. A mere power to exchange land, whether such exchange
is made directly or by means of a sale and new purchase, is not
a power to alien the estate, within the intent and meaning of the
S.... revised statutes on this subject. As well might it be con-
tended that a bequest of personal property was not rendered
inalienable, because the trustee who held it for the benefit of
another had the right to loan it out from time to time, and to
receive other money, when it became payable, instead of that
which was lent; although he had no right to dispose of the fund
itself."
The case was expressly affirmed as to this point in the Court of Errors,
and this result has never been departed from in subsequent cases. 7
Likewise, where real property is conveyed on trust for one life to be
then sold and converted into personal property and held for other
lives, it was held that "estates cannot be tied up during one life by
a trust in lands, and then for two lives more as personal property,
by means of a direction to convert them into money or personalty,
and then impressing on them new limitations in that form." 9
While therefore, it is perfectly possible for the creator of the
trust to confer on the trustee a power of sale or exchange,99 which
will not be in violation of section 65 since the trustee is only forbidden
to sell in contravention of the trust, (though this result was reached
only after considerable argument), yet "such a power would not
obviate the objection as to inalienability within the rule against
96 Paige, 318, 444-5 (N. Y. 1835).
97Brewer v. Brewer, ii Hun, 147 (1887), aff'd, 72 N. Y. 603; Allen v. Allen,
149 N. Y. 280, 43 N. E. 626 (1896); Whitfield v. Crissman, 123 App. Div. 233,
io8 N. Y. Supp. IIo (I9o8). Accord: Grand Rapids Trust Co. v. Herbst, supra
note 26. Cf. Becker v. Chester, ibid.
98Comstock, J., in Savage v. Burnham, 17 N. Y. 561, 572 (1858). Contra,
in states where no rule against suspension of the absolute ownership of personal
property: Palms v. Palms, 68 Mich. 355, 36 N. W. 419 (1888); Becker v. Chester,
supra note 26. But see Grand Rapids Tr. Co. v. Herbst, ibid.
99Belmont v. O'Brien, supra note 58; Fitzgerald v. Topping, 48 N. Y. 438
(1872), conditional right to sell; Lahey v. Kortright, 132 N. Y. 450, 456, 30
N. E. 989 (1892).
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perpetuities."'' I The trust attaches to the funds produced by the
sale, or the property received in exchange, and the objection is to
a trust which may not be destroyed or terminated at will. However,
as appears more fully elsewhere in this paper, there is no suspension
of the power of alienation if the trustee is empowered to sell and free
the fund from the trust,10' or to convey the property to the cestui que
trust.
Revocation by settlor. While the reservation of a power of revo-
cation in the creator of a trust or the giving of a power to the trustee
to destroy the trust at will, is not inconsistent with the existence of
a valid trust, 02 saving rights of creditors, yet in the absence of such
a reservation the settlor may not revoke the trust.03 The creator
may, however, reserve such large rights of control and enjoyment
that no trust will result. 0 4 So long as an unconditional power of
revocation exists in the creator, or a power to destroy the trust
rests in the trustee, there can be no suspension of the power of
alienation. 05
III. MEANING OF "SUSPENSION OF THE ABSOLUTE POWER
OF ALIENATION" AND "SUSPENSION OF
THE ABSOLUTE OWNERSHIP."
The terms "suspension of the absolute power of alienation" and
"suspension of the absolute ownership" seem to have been coined by
the revisers, though somewhat similar phrases may be found in
the reported cases from early times in connection with the common
'O0Belmont v. O'Brien, supra note 58, at 402. It has been held that the legis-
lature may not by private act authorize a conveyance by the trustee where the
creator of the trust did not confer the power, Powers v. Bergen, 6 N. Y. 358
(1852). But § 65 has since been amended to permit the Supreme Court to
authorize a conveyance in certain cases. See R. P. L. § io5; U. S. Trust Co. v.
Roche, 116 N. Y. 120, 130, 22 N. E. 265 (1889); Losey v. Stanley, supra note 57.
"'Robert v. Coming, supra note i9; Keyser v. Mead, 53 Misc. 114, 103 N. Y.
Supp. 1091 (1907).
"'Von Hesse v. MacKaye, supra note 25, creditors protected. Other cases
cited infra note 159.
"'Marvin v. Smith, 46 N. Y. 571 (187z), not even with the consent of the
beneficiary; McArthur v. Gordon, 126 N. Y. 597, 27 N. E. 1033 (r8gi).
1°4Matter of Bostwick, 16o N. Y. 489, 55 N. E. 208 (1899). Cf. Matter of
Masury, 28 App. Div. 580, 51 N. Y. Supp. 331 (1898), aff'd, i59 N. Y. 532, 53
N. E. 1127.
"'1Van Cott v. Prentice, supra note j6, at 54; Schreyer v. Schreyer, ioi App.
Div. 456, 91 N. Y. Subp. io65 (i9o5), aff'd, 182 N. Y. 555, 75 N. E. 1134; Equi-
table Trust Co. v. Pratt, I17 Misc. 708, 193 N.Y. Supp. 152 (1922), aff'd, 2o6
App. Div. 689, I99 N. Y. Supp. 921.
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law rule against perpetuities. Section 42 of the New York Real
Property Law provides :108
"The absolute power of alienation is-suspended when there
are no persons in being iby-whoman. absolute- fee in possession
can be conveyed. Every future estate shall be void in its
creation, which shall suspend the absolute power of alienation,
by any limitation or condition whatever, for a longer period than
during the continuance of not more than two lives in being at
the creation of the estate;..."
Section ii of the New York Personal Property Law provides, 107
"The absolute ownership of personal property shall not be
suspended by any limitation of condition, for a longer period
than during the continuance and until the termination of not
more than two lives in being at the date of the instrument con-
taining such limitation or condition; or, if such instrument be
a last will and testament, for not more than two lives in being
at the death of the testator. In other respects limitations of
future or contingent interests in personal property, are subject
to the rules prescribed in relation to future estates in real
property."
Section 42 of the Real Property Law, as we have seen, defines
suspension of "the absolute power of alienation." It was said in an
early case that "the term 'suspense of absolute ownership', applied to
personal property, means the same thing as 'suspense of the power of
alienation' applied to real property."'0 s The power of alienation or!
absolute ownership is suspended only while therie are no persons in
being and ascertained, by whom an absolute interest can be conveyed.
1 Formerly, R. S. §§ 14, 15 and 16:
§ r4. "Every future estateshall bevoid in its creation, which shall suspend the
absolute power of alienation for a longer period than is prescribed in this Article.
Such power of alienation is suspended, when there are no persons in being, by
whom an absolute fee in possession can be conveyed.
§ 15. ' The absolute power of alienation shallnuot be suspended by any limitation
or condition whatever, for a longer period than during the continuance of not
more than two lives in being at the creation of the estate, except in the single
case mentioned in the next section of this Article.
§ x6. "A contingent remainder in fee, may be created on a prior remainder in
fee, to take effect in the event that the person to whom the first remainder is
limited, shall die under the age of twenty-one years, or upon any other con-
tingency, by which the estate of such persons may be determined before they
attain that age."
'"Formerly, R. S., Part II, Title IV, c. IV, § § i and 2, without substantial
change.
0'0 Gott v. Cook, supra note 7, at 543; Emmons v. Cairns, 3 Barb. 243, 244-5
(N. Y. 1848).
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As was said in Sawyer v. Cubby,109 "the statutory test of what con-
stitutes a suspension . . . of absolute ownership as to personal
property, is that it occurs only when there are no persons in being
by whom an absolute estate in possession can be conveyed." This
statement was amplified somewhat by Vann, J., in Williams v.
Montgomery,n0 in considering whether the absolute ownership of
stock could be suspended by agreement of the owners. He said:
"There was no suspension of absolute ownership, because the
statute expressly declares that the 'Power of alienation is sus-
pended when there are no persons in being by whom an absolute
fee in possession can be conveyed.' (i R. S. 723, Sec. 14.)
While this applies primarily to real estate, by a subsequent
chapter it is made applicable to personal property also. (I R. S.
773, Sec. 2.) The test of alienability of real or personal property
is that there are persons in being who can give a perfect title.
... Where there are living parties who have unitedly the entire
right of ownership, the statute has no application. . . The
ownership is absolute whether the power to sell resides in one
individual or in several."
Since i9o9 it seems that suspension of the absolute ownership and
suspension of the absolute power of alienation also include the idea
of remoteness of vesting."'
Common law rule against restraints on alienation distinguished.
The statutory rule against suspension of the power of alienation
should not be confused with the common law rule against restraints
on the alienation of property."' The statutory rule is directed at
suspension of the power of alienation for a longer period than during
two lives in being at the creation of the estate or interest."3 If the
power of alienation is not suspended, or if it is suspended only during
one life in being or two lives in being, the statutory rule is not violated.
If by any possibility the statutory rule may be violated, the whole
109146 N. Y. I92, i96, 40 N. E. 869 (1895). Cf. Wells v. Squires, supra note 8o,
at 503-4, "It is perfectly well settled that there can be no suspension of absolute
ownership when there are persons in being who can convey an absolute title."
no04 8 N. Y. 519, 525-6, 43 N. Y. 57 (1896).
"'Matter of Wilcox, 194 N. Y. 288, 306, 87 N. E. 497 (19o9); Walker v. Mar-
cellus, etc., Ry., 226 N. Y. 347, 123 N. E. 736 (i919). Cf. the language of the
court in Greenland v. Waddell, 116 N. Y. 234, 22 N. E. 367 (1889); and In re
Water Front, etc., supra note 2, at 29-30.
mSee, generally, GRAY, RESTRAINS ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY (2d ed.
1895); GRAY, op. cit. supra note I, §§ 118a, 119, 268 et seq.; KALES, EsTATES,
FuTuRE INTERESTS AND ILLEGAL CONDITIONS AND RESTRAINTS (2d ed. 1920)
Chaps. XXVII, XXVIII; Sweet, Restraints on Alienation (1917) 33 L. Q. REV.
236, 342.
"'Robert v. Coming, supra note i9.
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estate or interest is void ab initio."4 The common law rule against
restraints on alienation is directed primarily at restraints on the
alienation of vested absolute interests, as for example, when a fee
simple is conveyed and in the deed the grantee is forbidden to alienate
or encumber his interest on pain of forfeiture. In such case the power
of alienation is not suspended, the grantee can convey good title,
and in the normal case the restraint is itself void, but the deed good.,,
It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss in detail the limits of
the rule that restraints on the alienation of fee simple interests in
land or similar interests in chattels are void,', or to what extent such
restraints partial as to time or as to persons3'7 or restraints on the
alienation of estates for years and for life or other qualified interests,
or restraints on equitable interests, may be valid."8 Attention should
be called, however, to the fact that much of the common law rule
remains in force in New York, but it does not cover the same field
which is covered by the statutory rule." 9
14R. P. L. § 42, quoted supra; Schettler v. Smith, 41 N. Y. 328, 334 (z869).
"The rule is that where, by the terms of an instrument creating an estate,
there may be an unlawful suspension of the power of alienation or of the absolute
ownership, the limitation is void, although it turn out by subsequent events
that no actual suspension beyond the prescribed period would have taken place.
In other words, to render such future estates created by will valid, they must be
so limited that in every possible contingency they will absolutely terminate
within the period of two lives in being at the death of the testato'r, or the estate
will be held void." Martin, J., in Hertzog v. Title G. & T. Co., i77 N. Y. 86,
99, 69 N. E. 283 (1903).
"To render a trust valid, it must be so limited that in every possible contingency
there will be an absolute termination thereof within the period prescribed by
statute." Matter of Hitchcock, 222 N. Y. 57, 71, 118 N. E. 220 (1917).
SRePosher, 26 Ch. D. 8oi (1884); Re Dugdale, 38 Ch. D. 176 (1888), equitable
estate in fee; Potter v. Couch, 141 U. S. 296, 1i Sup. Ct. iooS (189o); Murray v.
Green, 64 Calif. 363, 28 Pac. 118 (1883); Davis v. Hutchinson, 282 Ill. 523, 118
N. E. 72z (1918); Schermerhorn v. Negus, i Denio, 448 (N. Y. 1845); DePeyster v.
Michael, 6. N. Y. 467 (1852), money penalty for alienation and reservation of
pre-emptive right of purchase.
"
6Fears v. Brooks, 12 Ga. 195 (1852), alienation of separate estate of married
woman may be restrained; First Universalist Soc. v. Boland, I55 Mass. 171,
29 N. E. 524 (1892), restraint on alienation by a charity valid.
n"See (1920) 5 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY 361, and Mandlebaum v. McDonnel,
29 Mich. 78 (874).
UsSupra note 112. See also Cowell v. Springs Co., zoo U. S. 55 (1879); Plumb v.
Tubbs, 41 N. Y. 442 (1869).
n9Schermerhorn v. Negus, supra note 115, restraints on alienation by children
except to each other, void; DePeyster v. Michael, supra note 115; Greeney.
Greene, 125 N Y. 5o6, 512, 26 N. E. 739 (1891), where trust for three sons failed
by merger and sons took fee, restraints against alienation and partiton for six
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IV. How THE POWER OP ALIENATION MAY BE SUSPENDED
The language of the courts. It has been frequently stated that
suspension of the power of alienation is caused in two ways, by the
creation of contingent future interests, and by the creation of a trust.
Thus in Leonard v. Burry ° Denio, J., used this language:
"There are two methods by which the absolute ownership
and power of alienation may be suspended. One is by creating
a future estate by way of executory devise or contingent re-
mainder. In such cases, as it cannot be known in whom the
future estate will ultimately vest, and as the person in whom it
will so vest may not be in existence, no person can convey an
absolute fee. The present case belongs to this class ... The
other manner is by annexing to a present absolute estate in fee
a trust, which by the general provisions of law would render it
inalienable (i R. S. 730, Sec. 6o), or by directing the income or
profits to be applied in perpetuity to some charitable purpose, in
which case an alienation would be hostile to the object of the
conveyance."
It should be noted that Judge Denio was dealing with a case which
involved possible suspension of the power of alienation by reason
of the attempted creation of a future contingent interest, where the
contingency was as to the person, and his statement that contingent
future interests may suspend the power of alienation is expressly
limited to future interests, contingent as to the person. It is obvious
that suspension of the power of alienation must result from the
creation of a future contingent interest vesting upon the happening
of some future uncertain event, and in respect of which that person
in whom the estate may vest cannot now be ascertained or may not
be in esse. Since suspension of the power of alienation by a trust
was not involved in Leonard v. Burr, we will examine the language of
Earl, J., in Mtrphy v. Whitney,1' where he said:
"Estates can be rendered inalienable by vesting them in trustees
upon some one of the valid trusts mentioned in section 55 of the
years were void, and "as invalid limitations upon the free ownership of the
property devised, they are void and may be disregarded." Accord: Brown v.
Brown, 54 App. Div. 6, 66 N. Y. Supp. 218 (I9OO); Adams v. Berger, 27 Abb.
N. C. 429, x8 N. Y. Supp. 33 (i89i), restrai.t'against sale or partition for ten
years void. Cf. Oxley v. Lane, 35 N. Y. 34o, 346-7 (1866), where it was er-
roneously stated that restraints on alienation were void only when for more than
two lives in being. See also Tillman v. Ogren, 227 N Y. 495, 125 N. E. 821
(1920), as io repugnancy 1by gift over after conveyance of a fee.
2018 N..Y. 96, 107 (1858). Cf. Everitt v. Everitt, supra note 69, at 71-2;
Smith v. Edwards, 88 N. Y. 92, 102 (1882).
u'I4o N. Y. 541, 546, 35 N. E. 930 (1894). Cf. Steinway v. Steinway, x63
N. Y. 183, 194, 57 N. E. 312 (1goo).
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article upon trusts, so that they become inalienable under section
,65 for a period of more than two lives in being at the creation of
the trust, or by the creation of future, contingent or expectant
,estates so that there are no persons in being during the two
lives who can convey a perfect title. (Smith v. Edwards, 88
N.y. 104.) Here none of these conditions existed."
While no trust existed in Murphy v. Whitney, Judge Earl's statement
has been selected because it expresses the way in which the power of
alienation may be suspended by a trust more accurately than is done
in many cases. It is to be noted that such suspension results only
where the estate is vested in trustees upon one of the valid trusts
mentioned in section 55,12 and in respect of which inalienability
results under sections 63 and 6 5,12 for a period of more than two
lives in being. As we have seen, the interest of the beneficiary in
trusts of the third and fourth classes under section 55 was rendered
inalienable by section 63.12 Likewise, the interest of the trustee,
who had the whole estate under section 6o,12 was rendered inalienable
by section 65 .126 It is by reason of these provisions that the power of
alienation was suspended by the creation of a trust under the third
and fourth subdivisions of section 55. Suspension of the power of
alienation by contingent future interests and by trusts will be dis-
cussed in detail below. It should be noted at this point that sus-
pension of the power of alienation is not caused by the attempt to
create a passive trust which is executed by the statute,112 nor by
an equitable charge,n6b nor by the mere creation of a power.12
Suspension of Alienation by powers. It remains to consider whether
the power of alienation may be suspended in any other manner. It
=R. S. § 55; now, R. P. L. § 96.
mNow, R. P. L. §§ IO3, IO5.
14See supra page 43. The power of alienation cannot be suspended by trusts
of the first and second classes where the trustee must at all times have the power
to sell and terminate the trust. See Radley v. Kuhn, supra note 78. But see
note 85, supra.
I25Supra, p. 41.
12Supra, P. 47.
'5aDenison v. Denison, supra note 22; Wendt v. Walsh, supra note 23.
n2bSee cases cited, supra note 24.
m2ceTucker v. Tucker, 5 N. Y. 4o8 (I851); Henderson v. Henderson, supra
note ii; Quade v. Bertsch, 65 App. Div. 60o, 607, 72 N. Y. Supp. 916 (igoi),
aff'd, 137 N. Y. 615, 66 N. E. iir, where the court said, "Even if the testator
did attempt to create a trust estate, the trust would be illegal, and.could have
no force or effect upon the question at bar (Smith v. Edwards, 88 N. Y. 92,
102, 103), while the deferring of payment, through the creation of a power in
trust meanwhile, is not a suspension of the absolute ownership of the property."
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was said by Chief Judge Parker in Wilber v. Wilber,127 "there are only
two methods by which such a result can be accomplished: i. by
the creation of a trust which vests the estate in trustees; 2. by the
creation of future estates vesting upon the occurrence of some future
and contingent event," It should be noted that Judge Parker did
not limit the second part of his statement to contingent remainders
which were contingent as to the person, as Judge Denio had carefully
done in Leonard v..:Burr.128 Nor did he limit the first part of his
statement as Judge Earl had done in Murphy v. Whitney."19 Un-
fortunately, the courts have not always been careful to qualify their
language in speaking of the ways in which the power of alienation
may be suspended."0 Furthermore, it should be noted that suspension
of the power of alienation may also be caused by the creation of a
power. The extremely technical and complex rules of the common law
of powers were swept away by the Revised Statutes, and a statutory
system of powers substituted. Any detailed consideration of this
system is beyond the scope of this paper, but attention must be
directed to two sections of the Article on powers and their effect in
causing suspension of the power of alienation in certain cases. By
section 128,11 the common law doctrine of relation in the law of
powers was preserved, and by section 129 132 it was provided,
"No estate or interest can be given or limited to any person,
by an i-n-strument in execution of a power, which such person
would not have been capable of taking, under the instrument by
which the power was granted."
Under these provisions, by the application of the doctrine of relation,"3
an instrument in execution of a power may cause suspension of the
power of alienation by creating a trust or by the limitation of a
12'i6 5 N. Y. 451, 54 N. E. 264 (I901).
"
8Supra note 120.
129Supra note 121.
"30 Cases cited, supra notes 120, 121. In Steinway v. Steinway the court said,
"It is settled law that the absolute ownership is suspended in one of two ways,
either by the creation of future estates vesting upon the occurrence of some
future and contingent event, or by the creation of a trust which vests the same
in trustees." This is obviously too broad. Cf. Matter of Roberts, 112 App. Div.
732, 735, 98 N. Y. Supp. 809 (19o6).
"'Now, R. P. L. § 178.
"12Now, R. P. L. § 179.
'
3See Dana v. Murray, 122 N. Y. 604, 26 N. E. 21 (189o); Fargo v. Squires,
supra note Ig; Farmer's L. & T. Co. v. Kip, supra note 72. But a trust deed and
a subsequent will are not read together-N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v, Cary, 191 N. Y.
33, 39-41, 83 N. B. 598 (19o8).
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future contingent interest, contingent as to the personY.4 As was
said by Denio, C. J. in Everitt v. Everitt:1
"But a perpetuity can no more be created by the execution of
a power than by a direct devise or conveyance; and the period
during which the power of alienation may be suspended by an
instrument in execution of a power, is to be computed from the
time of the creation of the power."
Furthermore, a power may cause suspension of the power of alien-
ation where by its terms it is not vested in a person in esse, or not to
-be exercised until a time too remote. This was well expressed by
Judge Finch in Matter of Will of Butterfield,"6 as follows:
"The power of sale conferred upon the executrix suspends
the absolute power of alienation beyond the permitted period.
It is lrnited not upon lives in being as the statute requires, but
upon five minorities which may prevent a complete transfer for
as many lives. No conveyance could give a perfect and absolute
title while overshadowed by the trust power which might, at any
time during the prescribed minorities, defeat the estate granted."
So also the existence or exercise of a power may contribute to cause
a suspension where, for example, a power of sale is to be exercised
after four years, and the proceeds paid over to a trustee upon a void
trust. 13 7 Other ways in which the existence of a power, or its exercise,
may cause or contribute to the suspension of, the power of alienation
will be considered below in connection with suspension by trusts.
Suspension by contingent future interests. At common law a con-
tingent future interest, in the nature of an executory devise or springing
use, or a contingent remainder, which may by any possibility vest
in interest after lives in being and twenty-one years and a possible
period of gestation, is void in its creation.Y3 8 This is now known as
134Genet v. Hunt, supra note 57. A power to sell, or any power not inconsistent
with alienation, cannot cause suspension. Tucker v. Tucker, 5 N. Y. 4o8 (1851);
Henderson v. Henderson, 113 N. Y. I, 2o N. E. 814 (1889); Matter of Young,
145 N. Y. 535, 4o N. E. 226 (1895); Steinway v. Steinway, supra note 21.
13'Supra note 12o, at p. 78.
"'133 N. Y. 473, 475, In re Christie, 31 N. E. 515 (1892), power of sale not to be
exercised until after five minorities. But where all interests are vested, and no
trust intervenes, the beneficiaries of a power to sell and distribute the proceeds
can override the power, unless a contrary intent appears. Hetzel v. Barber, 69
N. Y. i, 11-12 (1877); Trasl; v. Sturges, 17o N. Y. 482, 497, 63 N. E. 534 (1902).
137Garvey v. McDevitt, 72 N. Y. 556 (1878). Accord: Van Vechten v. Van
Vechten, 8 Paige, 1O4, 124 (N. Y. 1840).
I"Cadell v. Palmer, i Clark & F. 372 (H. L. 1833); Evans v. Walker, 3 Ch. D.
211 (1876); Abbiss v. Burney, 17 Ch. D. 211 (i88i); London & S. W. Ry. Co. v.
Gomm, 20 Ch. D. 562 (1882); In re Ashforth, [igo5] i Ch. 535; and see GRAY,
loc. cit. supra note 2; KALES, op. cit. supra note 112, Chaps. VI, XXVI.
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the rule against remoteness of vesting.13 9 There has been a sharp
dispute as to whether the common law rule in New York was, at
the time of the adoption of the Revised Statutes in 1828, a rule
against remoteness of vesting or a rule against the creation of inalien-
able future interests. We shall have occasion to refer to this matter
again,140 but there can be no doubt that by section 42 of the Real
Property Law, and section ii of the Personal Property Law, as inter-
preted by the courts, there exists in New York a rule against the crea-
tion of contingent future interests, which may by any possibility vest in
interest at a time too remote, and in respect of which the p6rson in
whom the interest may vest cannot be ascertained or may not be in esse
until a time too remote.14af a testator should devise lands to B "until
Gloversville shall be incorporated as a village," and then to the
descendents of C then living, obviously the incorporation of the
village might happen after the termination of more than two lives
in being, and the descendents of C who could qualify to take could
not be ascertained until the happening of the event, and might not
be in esse3.Such a devise would occassion an illegal suspension of
the power of alienation. B's estate would be good until the happen-
ing of the event named, but the remainder would fail, and a possibility
of reverter result to the grantor and his heirs.14' So, where a testator
directed his executors to keep $3o,ooo invested and to make certain
dispositions of the income, and when his "youngest grandchild born,
or that may within 20 years be born, shall arrive at full age, or if
a granddaughter shall sooner be lawfully married," then to divide
a portion of this fund between all his grandchildren then living,
including those born after his death, the court found that no trust
was created by this portion of the will, but the interests of the grand-
children were necessarily pontingent since "the condition of survival
attaches to the gift itself; who the legatees would in fact prove to be
depended upon a future contingency. Those who were to take in
the prescribed event were uncertain. until it happened; might not
be any one of those in esse at testator's death, and ,might prove
to be a grandchild born 20 years later. The ultimate -vesting of this
19GniAY, op. cit. supra note 2, Chaps. I, VII.
14°Infra, second installment of this article.141Schettler v. Smith, supra note 114; Knox v. Jones, 47 N. Y. 389 (1872);
Purdy v. Hoyt, 92 N.Y. 446 (1883); Greenland v. Waddell, supra note iii, at
244-56.
Cf. Stoiberv. Stoiber, 4o App. Div. I56, z6o, 57 N.Y. Supp. 916 (1899), where
trust did not suspend alienation but ultimate disposition to persons not in being;
Matter of Perry, 48 Misc. 285, 96 N. Y. Supp. 879 (1905).
142Leonard v. Burr, supra note 120.
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portion of the principal of the special fund was, therefore, plainly
postponed for 2o years, and not during designated lives in being; and
must be declared invalid.''<This is a clear case of suspension of the
power of alienation of a fund by future limitations contingent as to
the person, for a period of years, or during possible unborn lives,
in either of which cases it is illegal and void.
So also, where a testator, after having validly limited his estate in
trust for the lives of his two youngest children, by a codicil attempted
to provide that in case one daughter (not one of the two youngest)
should marry X, then a certain portion should be held during her
life also, to pay her an annuity, and upon her death to be divided among
her surviving children, it was held, without deciding whether or not
the annuity so given suspended the power of alienation, that the
disposition to the grandchildren of the testator suspended alienation
by reason of the fact that their interests were unvested and they
would not be ascertained until after the termination of three lives
in being. The whole codicil failed, but the will was saved. 44
In many cases suspension of the power of alienation may be found
either in the fact that a future interest, contingent as to the person,
has been limited after more than two lives in being, or after a period
in gross, or in the fact that a present trust has been created by the
same instrument, suspending the power of alienation for more than
two lives in being or for a period of years. 45 This was the situtation
in Benedict v. Salmon,'" where a residence was devised to trustees
to hold as a home for the use and occupation of any of eight daughters
who should be unmarried or widows, until the death of the survivor,
with remainders to the children of the daughters then living. The
trust was held void as there was no one who could convey an absolute
fee in possession, and the future estate given to the children was also
void. Wherever the testator creates a trust for more than two lives
14Smith v. Edwards, supra note 12o; cf. Hannan v. Osborn, 4 Paige, 336, 341
(1834).
1
"Hertzog v. Title G. & T. Co., supra note 114, at 98. Cf. Dote v. Yost, 188
App. Div. 792, 177 N. E. Supp. 332 (i919), quaere whether contingency as to
person; Fulton Trust Co.v. Phillips;-i8 N.Y. 573, 113 N. E. 558 (1916), future
gift to possibly unborn children was held to vest after termination of only one
life in being and therefore valid.
115Dana v. Murray, supra note 133, at 616-7, involving both trust and power;
Hertzog v. Title G. & T. Co., supra note 114; Benedict v. Salmon, i77 App. Div.
385, 163 N. Y. Supp. 846 (1907), aff'd, 223 N. Y. 707, 12o N. E. 858; Evans v.
Curtis, 1O3 Misc. I61, 17o N. Y. Supp. 8oo (I918). Cf. Haynes v. Sherman, 117
N. Y. 433, 22 N. E. 938 (1889); Matter of Self, supra note 24, at 567; Steinway v
Steinway, supra note 121.
146Supra note 145.
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in being, followed by a remainder contingent as to the person, the
disposition is held void, but there will be no illegal suspension of
alienation if the present interests are given absolutely and not by
way of trust, and the future estate must vest in interest within the
required period of two lives in being,147 even though possession or
payment over may be postponed.148
In addition to the invalidity of future interests contingent as to
the person, which suspend the power of alienation for a period beyond
two lives in being, it seems to be established in New York today that
where there is no uncertainty as to the person to take and conse-
quently no period of inalienability, but only an uncertainty as to
the happening of the event upon which the future estate or interest
is to vest in designated persons, nevertheless such contingent interests
are void if vesting may be postponed beyond two lives in being.'49
This is nothing more nor less than the continuance of the common law
rule against remoteness of vesting.
Suspension of alienation by trusts. As has been pointed out, sus-
pension of the power of alienation may be caused by the creation of
certain kinds of trusts, and if they may by any possibility continue
beyond the period permitted by law, then the trusts fail ab initio.14
It is apparent that trusts of the first and second classes do not
suspend the power of alienation, since they are expressly created
for the purpose of enabling the trustee to alienate the property,150
and the interests of beneficiaries of such trusts are not inalienable
under section 63 .  Trusts of the fourth class generally cause sus-
pension of the power of alienation, but they are otherwise limited
so that this question does not usually arise'8 2 It is in respect of
trusts of the third class that suspension of the power of alienation
most often occurs. While the statement will be found in many cases
that the absolute power of alienation is suspended by the creation
'
47Wilber v. Wilber, supra note 127, devise to grandchildren of whom one was
in being, subject to an estate for fifteen years in three named persons, there
being no trust. See also Durfee v. Pomeroy, 1.54 N. Y. 583, 49 N. E. 132 (1898);
Matter of Roberts, supra note 130.
148Matter of Ossman v. Van Roeer, 221 N. Y. 381, 117 N. E. 576 (1917);
Matter of Trevor, 239 N. Y. 6, 145 N. E. 66 (1924).
14'Dote v. Yost, supra note 144; Matter of Wilcox, supra note i i i; Walker v.
Marcellus, etc. Ry., ibid.
"aCoster v. Lorillard, 14 Wend. 265 (N.Y. 1835); Hertzogv. Title G. &T. Co.,
supra note 114.
"
0SuPra P. 33,45.
...Supra P. 43.
162Supra p. 39-40.
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of a trust vesting the estate in trustees upon an authorized trust,
these dicta are obviously too broad.153 The only trusts which suspend
the power of alienation-are those in which the trustee and beneficiary
are forbidden by statute to convey their respective interests, in other
words, trusts of the third and fourth classes under section 55. More-
over, even in trusts of these classes if the trustee has power to alienate
the property and terminate the trust, no suspension results. In
Robert v. Corning,54 trustees were directed to sell the testator's real
estate in New York after three weeks public notice, and other real
estate in whatever manner they saw fit, with the privilege of delaying
in their discretion for a period of not more than three years. It was
held that whether the trustees took a trust estate or merely a power,
no suspension of the power of alienation resulted, and the provision
for three week's notice did not matter. These principles are expressed
with unusual clarity by Andrews, Ch. J., in the case named:'6
"Construing sections 14, and 15, together, it is manifest, that
where there are persons in being at the creation of an estate,
capable of conveying an immediate and absolute fee in possession,
there is no suspension of the power of alienation.
"If the suspension is effected by the creation of future con-
tingent estates, the validity of the limitation depends upon the
question whether the contingency upon which the estates depend,
must happen within the prescribed period. If the suspension is
effected by the creation of an express trust to receive the rents
and profits of land, under section 55 of the statute of uses and
trusts (i R. S. 728), the lawfulness of the suspension, depends
upon the question, whether the trust term is in respect of
duration, lawfully constituted. But the mere creation of a
trust, does not, ipso facto, suspend the power of alienation.
It is only suspended by such a trust, where a trust term is created,
either expressly or by implication, during the existence of which,
a sale by the trustee, would be in contravention of the trust.
Wherethe trustee is impowered to sell thelandwithout restriction
as to time, the power of alienation is not suspended, although the
alienation in fact may be postponed, by the non-action of the
trustee, or, in consequence of a discretion reposed in him, by the
'0Supra p. 53 et seq.
154Supra note 19.
'At pp. 235-6; and at p. 238 he continued, '!The direction that the real estate
in this state should be sold at public sale, on three weeks' notice, was a prudential
arrangement to insure a fair sale, and prevent a sacrifice of the property, and in
no proper sense suspended the power of alienation... The statute of perpetuities
is not violated by directions which may involve some delay in the actual con-
version or division of the property, rising from the necessity of giving notice, or
doing other preliminary acts... Such delays are not within the reason or policy
of the statute."
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creator of the trust. The statute of perpetuities is pointed only
to the suspension of the power of alienation, and not at all to the
time of its actual exercise, and when a trust for sale and distribu-
tion is made, without restriction as to time, and the trustees are
impowered to receive the rents and profits, pending the sale for
the benefit of beneficiaries, the fact that the interest of the
beneficiaries is inalienable by statute, during the existence of the
trust, does not suspend the power of alienation, for the reason,
that the trustees are persons in being, who can, at any time,
convey an absolute fee in possession."
Robert v. Corning settled the law on this point and has been followed
in many cases.156 Buiti"ffthe__tuste_ has a mere power to exchange
the trust property for other property, or to sell and reinvest in other
property which is to continue subject to the trust, we have seen that
this is not such a power of alienation as will satisfy the statute and
obviate suspension of the power of alienation.15 7
Power of revocation by settlor, or power in 'rustee to convey to settlor
or beneficiary. Where the trustee has an absolute power to reconvey
the trust property to the settlor, there can be no suspension of the
power of alienation,58 and the same result fellows where the settlor
reserves a power of revoking the trust.159 So also, there will be no
suspension of the power of alienation where the trustee has an
absolute power to convey the property to the beneficiary. If, how-
ever, the trustee is given only a right to terminate the trust or to
HASee, for example, Crooke v. County of Kings, supra note 61, at 447; Hender-
son v. Henderson, supra note 134; Deegan v. Wade, 144 N. Y. 573, 39 N. E. 692
(1895), executor directed to sell at public auction in the spring of 1891, following
testator's death; Spitzer v. Spitzer, 38 App. Div. 436, 56 N. Y. Supp. 470 (1899);
Matter of Wilcox, supra note iii, at 3o4, semble; Doscher v. Wyckoff, 132 App.
Div. i39, i z6 N.Y. Supp. 389 (I9o9), trustee also beneficiary; Matter of Kohler,
193 App. Div. 8, 27, 183 N. Y. Supp. 550 (1920), rev'd on other grounds, 231
N. Y. 353, 132 N. E. 114; Epstein v. Werbelovsky, 193 App. Div. 428, 184 N. Y.
Supp. 330 (1920), aff'd, 233 N. Y. 525, 135 N. E. 902. Accord: Thatcher v.
St. Andrews Church, 37 Mich. 264, 270-2 (1877); In re Spring's Estate, 216 Pa.
St. 529, 66 Atl. 110 (1907), under Pa. Statute against accumulation.
But see In re Perkins Estate, supra note 2, where a trust for three lives was
held void although the trustees were expressly given power in their discretion to
terminate the trust during one of the lives if in their discretion they deemed the
beneficiary able to take care of the property, considering his habits, capacity and
other circumstances. The majority of the court thought the case distinguishable
from Robert v. Coming. Two judges dissented.
...Supra p. 48.
158Van Cott v. Prentice, supra note 56.
159Von Hesse v. MacKaye, supra note 25, such power could not be for purpose
of defrauding creditors of settlor; Schreyer v. Schreyer, supra note io5, power of
revocation not inconsistent with continuance of trust; Equitable Trust Co. v.
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convey the property to the cestui que trust, when in his discretion
the latter stands in need of the corpus for his support or when the
trustee deems the cestui que trust of sober habits and capable of
taking care of the property, it has been held that the statute is not
satisfied. 60 If the power of the trustee to terminate the trust is
dependent upon contingencies, it is obviously not an absolute power
of alienation, and does not satisfy the statute. Thus, where the
trustee had power to sell only for a given sum,16' or with the consent
of the Supreme Court,16 2 the statute was not satisfied, since he may
not be able to sell for the sum named, and the Supreme Court is not
free to consent unless the facts warrant it.'0 But where the trustee
has power to terminate the trust with the consent of designated
persons who are in esse and free to consent, the statute is satisfied.'6
So also, while it seems to be settled that the statutory prohibition
against alienation by the cestui que trust is absolute, and the settlor
or testator cannot give him power to alienate, yet he may be given
power to demand or consent to a conveyance or sale and termination
of the trust by the trustee, and this will obviate suspension of the
Pratt, supra note lO5, reserved power of revocation obviated suspension during
life of settlor.
See also Marvin v. Smith, supra note 1O3, settlor cannot revoke unless right
of revocation reserved, even with consent of beneficiary; Arthur v. Gordon,
supra note io3, to same effect; Matter of Masury, supra note 1O4, existence of
power to revoke in settlor does not make property taxable as inheritance on his
death; Matter of Bostwick, supra note 1O4, aliter, where grantor reserves entire
control and enjoyment during his life; Brownv. Spohr, supra note 25, reservation
of power to revoke or modify and recital that beneficiaries took through settlor's
bounty not illegal in personal property trust; Matter of Carnegie, 2o3 App. Div.
9i, i96 N. Y. Supp. 502 (1922), aff'd, 236 N. Y. 517, I42 N. E. 266, where settlor
reserved right to revoke as to part and right to change beneficiaries, not subject
to transfer tax on his death.
160Roosevelt v. Roosevelt, 6 Hun, 31 (N.Y. 1875), aff'd, 64 N.Y. 651; Button v.
Hemmens, 92 App. Div. 4o , 86 N. Y. Supp. 829 (i9o4); Cushman v. Cushman,
116 App. Div. 763, 1O2 N. Y. Supp. 258 (1907), aff'd, 191 N. Y. 5o5, 84 N. E.
1122; In re Perkins' Estate, supra note 2.
'6Stewart v. Woolley, 121 App. Div. 531, zO6 N. Y. Supp. 99 (19o7).
162Genet v. Hunt, supra note 57, at 172, semble; Fowler v. Ingersoll, 127 N. Y.
472, 477, 28 N. E. 471 (I891).
lnO'Donaghue v. Smith, 184 N. Y. 365, 374, 77 N. E. 621 (I9O6).
164Spitzer v. Spitzer, 38 App. Div. 436, 56 N. Y. Supp. 470 (i899), executor
could not sell for less than $18,500 unless with consent of testator's five sons
or the survivors; Stoiber v. Stoiber, 40 App. Div. 156, 57 N. Y. Supp. 916(I899),
trustee could sell property and terminate trust with consent of children. Schreyer
v. Schreyer, supra note ios.
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power of alienation. 65 If the cestui que trust were free to convey or
release his interest to the trustee, the trust could be destroyed by
merger, and there would be no suspension of the power of alienation,
even though the trustee could not alienate before such release. It
does not matter that the power of alienation rests in many persons,
all of whom must join to convey a perfect title. As was said by Vann,
J., in Williams v. Montgomery,'66
"There was no suspension of absolute ownership, because the
statute expressly declares that the 'power of alienation is sus-
pended when there are no persons in being by whom an absolute
fee in possession can be conveyed' (i R. S. 723, sec. 14.). While
this applies primarily to real estate, by a subsequent chapter it
is made applicable to personal property also (i R. S. 773,
sec. 2.). The test of alienability of real and personal property is
that there are persons in being who can give a perfect title...
Where there are living parties who have unitedly the entire right
of ownership, the statute has no application... The ownership
is absolute whether the power to sell resides in one individual or
in several. If there is a present right to dispose of the entire
interest, even if its exercise depends upon the consent of many
persons, there is no unlawful suspension of the power of aliena-
tion. The ownership, although divided, continues absolute."
Revocation or destruction of the trust under statutory provisions.
Under the provisions of section 23 of the Personal Property Law'
1 7
the creator of a trust is authorized to revoke the same "upon the
written consent of all the persons beneficially interested in a trust of
personal property or any part thereof." It is obvious that suspension
of alienation cannot be avoided under this provision in respect of
testamentary trusts or real property trusts. 'Where, however, the
grantor or settlor of a personal property trust is in esse, and the
consent in writing of all the persons beneficially interested in such
trust can be secured, it is apparent that there is no suspension of the
power of alienation during the lifetime of the settlor. It does not
matter that such trust can only be revoked by the consent of many
165Marvin v. Smith, supra note IO3, and cases cited supra note r64. See
also Crooke v. County of Rings, supra note 61, at 447.
'0148 N. Y. 519, 525, 43 N. E. 57 (1896), holding there could be no suspension
by agreement. Accord: Buschman v. McDermott, 154 App. Div. 515, 139 N. Y.
Supp. 3x4 (1913), agreement by co-owners not to bring action for partition;
Crehan v. Megargel, 234 N. Y. 67, 136 N. E. 296 (1922), agreement to form new
trust in future. See also Mills v. Mills, 50 App. Div. 221, 63 N. Y. Supp. 77r
(1goo); Hammerstein v. Equitable Trust Co., 156 App. Div. 644, 653, 141 N.Y.
Supp. 1065 (1913), aff'd, 209 N. Y. 429, lO3 N. E. 706, trust; Matter of Stanton,
107 Misc. 326, 177 N. Y. Supp. 743 (I919), divided ownership.
267L. 1909, c. 247, not in R. S.
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persons,16 8 and it has been held that under this section it is impossible
and therefore unnecessary to secure the consent of contingent re-
maindermen who are not in esse, since the court can provide for the
protection of their future contingent interests. 6 9 Section 23 is
applicable although the trust is in terms declared to be irrevocable. 7 0
In 1893 section 63 of the Revised Statutes was amended' 7' to permit
the beneficiary of a real or personal property trust, who was entitled
to receive rents and profits or income for his life or a shorter period,
and who was also entitled to the remainder in the whole or a part of
such trust fund, to release his interest in the rents and profits or
income and thereby destroy the trusts. We will not examine in
detail the provisions of this amendment, but attention should be
called to the fact that for a period of ten years while this statute
was in force it was possible for the cestui que trust to buy in the
remainder and then destroy the trust. So it would seem that during
this period the power of alienation of real property and the absolute
ownership of personal property was not in any case suspended by
the creation of a trust for beneficiaries for their lives except when
the remainder was inalienable. 7 2 When the old law was restored in
1903,173 a saving clause was inserted preserving the right to terminate
such a trust by merger where it existed on that date.' 4 Merger under
these statutes was not confined to cases where the remainder had
devolved on the beneficiary by operation of law.17 5
168Hammerstein v. Equitable Tr. Co., supra note 166.
1'9Cram v. Walker, 173 App. Div. 804, 16o N. Y. Supp. 486 (1916); Aranyi v.
Bankers' Trust Co., 2oi App. Div. 706, 194 N. Y. Supp. 614 (1922). Consent of
contingent remaindermen in esse must be secured, Williams v. Sage, i8o App.
Div. I, 167 N. Y. Supp. 179 (1917). Settlor need not get consent of possible
heirs or next of kin, Whittemore v. Equitable Tr. Co., 162 App. Div. 607, 147
N. Y. Supp. io58 (914); Hoskin v. L. I. Loan and T. Co., 13"9 App. Div. 258,
123 N. Y. Supp. 994 (i9IO), aff'd, 203 N. Y. 588, 96 N. E. Ii6, section retro-
active. See also Crackanthorpe v. Sickles, 156 App. Div. 753, 141 N. Y. Supp.
370 (1913); Cruger v. Union Trust Co., 173 App. Div. 797, 16o N. Y. Supp. 480
(1916); Cazzani v. Title G. & T. Co., 175 App. Div. 369, I61 N. Y. Supp. 884
(I916), aff'd, 220 N. Y. 683, II6 N. E. IO4O.
170Aranyi v. Bankers' Trust Co., supra note 169.
1L. 1893, c. 452. Cf. L. 1896, c. 547, § 85; L. 1897, C. 417, § 3.
'
72Mills v. Mills, supra note 166; Matter of U. S. Trust Co., 175 N. Y. 304,
67 N. .614 (19o3), right of life beneficiary to remainder must be absolute before
he can destroy trust; Metcalfe v. Union Trust Co., supra note 57, whether
provision retroactive.
173L. 19o3, c. 88.
17
4For effect, see Speir v. Benvenuti, 194 App. Div. 769, r85 N. Y. Supp. 769
(1921), modified 197 App. Div. 209, x89 N. Y. Supp. 885.
75Mills v. Mills, supra note 166.
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Suspension is not obviated by merger, laches, waiver or estoppel.
But before 1893, and since 1903 no merger results where the life
beneficiary of a trust acquires the remainder by purchase or other-
wiseY' 6 His right to the remainder may be vested and alienable,
but cannot vest in possession until the prior trust runs its normal
course. This prohibition against destruction of a trust by merger
was not applied in Matter of Bloodgood,77 which was not a trust to
receive income. And where the beneficial interest in the trust fund,
or in a divisible share thereof, is vested in the trustee by virtue of
the instrument creating the trust, a merger results since the propo-
sition "that the legal and beneficial estates can exist and be maintained
separately in the same person is an inconceivable proposition.' 7 8
Some doubt was cast on this point in Losey v. Stanley,79 and certainly
no merger results by reason of the fact that the trustee is also the
beneficiary unless he was so designated by the will or instrument
creating the trust.180
The rules as to suspension of alienation of the interest of a cestui
que trust are not obviated by the possibility of a bar by estoppel,
laches, or waiver,'" or by compromise or conveyance under the
authority of the Supreme Court."" Thus, in Matter of Wentworth""
176Raymond v. Rochester, etc., Co., 75 Hun, 239, 27 N. Y. Supp. I (1894);
Asche v. Asche, I13 N. Y. 232, 21 N. E. 70 (1889); Dale v. Guaranty Tr. Co.,
168 App. Div. 6oi, I53 N. Y. Supp. IO4I (I915).
'7184 App. Div. 798, 172 N. Y. Supp. 509 (1918).
178Greene v. Greene, 125 N. Y. 506, 26 N. E. 739 (I891), devise of lands to
three sons in trust to receive and retain rents and profits, remainder to heirs,
subject to certain charges. Accord: Woodward v. James, 115 N. Y. 346, 357,
22 N.E. 15o (1889); Rosev. Hatch, 125 N.Y. 427, 26 N. E. 467 (1891). But see
Rogers v. Rogers, iii N. Y. 228, 237, I8 N. E. 636 (I888), fact beneficiary was
one of several trustees does not cause merger even when he becomes sole trustee
as court will appoint others or will itself administer trust; Robertson v. De-
Brulatour, 188 N. Y. 3oi, 317, 8o N. E. 938 (1907), to same effect; Major v.
Major, 177 App. Div. lO2, 163 N.Y. Supp. 925 (1917), aliter, where sole trustee
with power to pay over to self.
17 147 N. Y. 560, 568, 42 N. E. 8 (1895).
80Rogers v. Rogers, supra note 178.
181Matter of Wentworth, supra note 68. Cf. Woodbridge v. Bockes, 59 App.
Div. 5o3, 69 N. Y. Supp. 417 (19oi), aff'd, 17o N. Y. 596, 63 N. E. 362. The
statute is not, however, directed at suspension from causes outside the instrument.
Beardsley v. Hotchkiss, 96 N. Y. 201, 214 (1884), infancy; Livingston v. Tucker,
107 N. Y. 549, 552, 14 N. E. 443 (1882), accumulation resulting from forced sale;
La Chapelle v. Burpee, 69 Hun, 436, 23 N. Y. Supp. 453 (1893), imprisonment
for felony; Quade v. Bertsch, 65 App. Div. 6oo, 6o6, 72 N. Y. Supp. 916 (goI),
aff'd, 173 N. Y. 615, 66 N. E. I115, infancy.
18Genet v. Hunt, supra note 57, at 172; Cuthbert v. Chauvet, supra note 73.
18Supra note 68, at 183. See also the report of the same case when it was
before the Appellate Division, 19o App. Div. 829, I8I N. Y. Supp. 442.
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where the trustee with the consent of the cestui que trust conveyed
the trust property with the object of freeing it from the trust and
to enable the cestui que trust to speculate with the proceeds, and as
a result the money was lost, it was held that the trustee must account
for the property, Chief Judge Hiscock saying:
"We are all agreed upon what seems to be an obvious view that
if the interest of the cestui que trust in and under this trust was
by statute inalienable, the prohibition of the statute could not be
circumvented by any process of estoppel... The cases in this
court which he (appellant) cites... are those where a court of
equity has refused to approve the inequitable attempt of a cestui
que trust to hold a trustee personally responsible for doing what
he himself had asked, or where under peculiar circumstances
... the court has refused to disregard the conduct of the cestui
que trust and hold the trustee responsible for some feature of
mere mismanagement. On the contrary, the principle that
estoppel may not be employed as a means of accomplishing the
violation of a statute in the case of a trust is expressly recognized
in Douglas v. Cruger (8o N. Y. 15, 20)."
The possibility that the legislature may in certain cases authorize
a sale or partition by the trustee or cestui que trust, or both, does not
save a trust which is otherwise void for illegal suspension of the power
of alienation.184 Under statutes specifically authorizing the bene-
ficiary in certain cases to end the trust and acquire or convey an
absolute title, all suspension of the power of alienation is obviated.1 5
The Supreme Court has no authority to authorize destruction of a
trust for the receipt of rents and profits or income, even with the
consent of the trustee and cestui que trust.88
V. PERIOD DURING WHICH SUSPENSION OF THE POWER OF
ALIENATION PERMITTED
The period must be measured by not more than two lives in being.
As appeared from section 42 of the Real Property Law'87 the power
of alienation cannot be suspended "for a longer period than during
the continuance of not more than two lives in being at the creation
of the estate," and in one exceptional case which is not of particular
importance for our present problem, for the period of an actual
'UMetcalfe v. Union Trust Co., supra note 57; Matter of Asch, 75 App. Div.
486, 78 N. Y. Supp. 561 (i9O2). See Brearly School v. Ward, supra note 57.
183Leggett v. Hunter, supra note 72, at 46o-3.
186Supra note 73.
1'SSupra p. 5o.
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minority thereafter. 18 8 The language of section ii of the Personal
Property Law89 is slightly different but in substance means the same
thing as the Real Property Law. Under these provisions it was early
determined that suspension of the power of alienation for a reasonable
period of time, or for a period equivalent to the average duration of
a life, was not permitted. I9 0 It is now firmly established that the
power of alienation cannot be legally suspended for any period in
gross,' 91 however short, nor for a reasonable period,19 unless the
duration of such suspension is also limited on not more than two
18 8Following the portion quoted supra, § 42 provides "except that a contingent
remainder in fee may be created on a prior remainder in fee, to take effect in
the event that the persons to whom the first remainder is limited, die under the
age of 21 years, or on any other contingency by which the estate of such persons
may be determined before they attain full age. For the purposes of this section,
a minority is deemed a part of a life, and not an absolute term equal to the
possible duration of such minority." Except for the last sentence, this portion
of § 42 is substantially a reenactment of R. S. § 16. For a case in which it was
involved, see Manice v. Manice, supra note ii, at 374-38x.
In no case may the absolute ownership of personal property be suspended
beyond the period of two lives in being. Ibd. 381-3; Greenland v. Waddell,
supra note iii, at 245.
Likewise, a trust for the accumulation of the income of personal property is
limited to two lives in being. Manice v. Manice, supra note iT, at 381; Gilman v.
Reddington, supra note 63, at Ig.
It is doubtful whether a trust of real property can be created to continue for a
minority after two lives, followed by an ultimate gift over. See Chaplin, New
York T~usts to Apply Rents during a Minority after Two Lives (1926) 26 COL. L.
Rav. 671, where the cases are discussed.
189Supra p. 5o.
'"Hawley v. James, supra note x8, at Ii9-126, and 166-174. See the argument
contra by Chancellor Walworth when this case was before him, 5 Paige, 3z8,
460 (N. Y. 1835).
'
91Hone v. Van Schaick, 7 Paige, 221 (N. Y. 1838), aff'd, 20 Wend. 564, not by
trust for 21 years; Trowbridge v. Metcalf, 5 App. Div. 318, 39 N. Y. Supp. 241
(1896), aff'd, i58 N. Y. 682, 52 N. E. X126, trust of lands for 5 years void;
Kalish v. Kalish, x66 N. Y. 368, 59 N. E. 917 (I901), five years; McGuire v.
McGuire, 8o App. Div. 63, 80 N. Y. Supp. 497 (1903), trust of real and personal
property for three years " may exceed the limit of two lives and is, therefore,
void"; Smith v. Chesebrough, 82 App. Div. 578, 81 N. Y. Supp. 570 (19o3),
two years; Hagenmeyer v. Saulvaugh, 97 App. Div. 535, 544, 90 N. Y. Supp.
228 (i9o4), trust until youngest child should reach 21, or if dead until such time
as she would have reached that age, void; Matter of Berry, 154 App. Div. 5o9,
139 N. Y. Supp. 186 (1913), aff'd, 2o9 N. Y. 54o, five years; Davis v. McMahon,
x61 App. Div. 458, 146 N. Y. Supp. 657 (1914), voting trust of stock and to
collect income for 25 years, void. But cf. note 155.
192Supra notes 19o, i9i.
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lives in being.193 It is, however, true that a trust may be limited for
a period of years if the trustees have power to destroy the trust at
any time, or at any time after two lives in being, since there would
be no suspension wherethe trustees could destroy the trust and
convey the property.19_fSuspension of the power of alienation may
lawfully continue during two lives in being at the creation of the
estate or- interest, and the minority of an infant in being, or other
fraction of a life in being, is held equivalent to one life if the sus-
pension is expressly or impliedly to cease upon the majority or death
of such person. 1 But no trust can be limited to continue during
more than two-lives in being, whether running concurrently or in
succession,"'O nor during one life and the minority of one or more
19Schermerhorn v. Cotting, 131 N. Y. 48, 29 N. E. 98o (1892), "a limitation
of a trust estate for an arbitrary period of time, such as fifty years, is valid,
provided a termination at an earlier period is called for by the expiration of two
lives in being at the creation of the trust"; Montignaniv. Blade, 145 N. Y. "iI,
39 N. E. 719 (1895), trusts for years measured by lives; Coston v. Coston, 1I8
App. Div. i, IO3 N. Y. Supp. 307 (1907), "until youngest of said children shall
attain the age of twenty-five," construed to mean until he attain that age or die,
valid; Kahn v. Tierney, 135 App. Div. 897, 12o N. Y. Supp. 663 (1909), aff'd, 201
N.Y. 516,94 N.E. xo95, trust for fixed period but one which must terminate within
two lives, valid; Matter of Lally, 136 App. Div. 781, 121 N. Y. Supp. 467 (1910),
aff'd, z98 N. Y. 6o8, 92 N. E. IO89, to same effect; Anthony v. Van Valkenburgh,
154 App. Div. 380, i39 N. Y. Supp. 599 (1912), trust for i9 years or during lives
of wife'and daughter, valid; Goldsmith v. Haskell, i81 App. Div. 5io, 169 N. Y.
Supp. i85 (1918), "until 25 years from date of will, providing my wife Clara is
not living," held valid as trust for life of wife.
1 94Cases cited, supra notes 155, 156. But see Underwood v. Curtis, 127
N. Y. 523, 28 N. E. 585 (189i), probably wrong on the point of construction.
1950xley v. Lane, supra note iig, at 345, for two minorities valid; Benedict v.
Webb, 98 N. Y. 460 (x885), "until my said children, or the youngest survivor of
them, shall have attained the age of 21," valid where only two children under 21
at testator's death, and could direct that share of one of the two be held for her
life, but not the share of a third child for its life; Jacoby v. Jacoby, 188 N. Y.
124, 8o N. E. 676 (1907), "after the youngest ... shall have attained the age
of 21," construed to mean youngest living at testator's death and valid; Boecher
v. Smoda Realty Co., 164 App. Div. 837, 15O N. Y. Supp. 263 (1914), to same
effect.
See also Coston v. Coston and Matter of Lally, supra note 193.
198Coster v. Lorillard, 14 Wend. 265 (N. Y. 1835); Hawleyv. James, supra note
18; Colton v. Fox, 67 N. Y. 348 (1876), trust for four lives void; Benedict v.
Webb, supra note i95; Underwood v. Curtis, supra, note i94; Whitfield v.
Crissman, 123 App. Div. 233, io8 N. Y. Supp. iio (i9O8); Simpson v. Trust Co.
of Am., 129 App. Div. 200, 113 N. Y. Supp. 370 (igo8), aff'd, 197 N. Y. 586,
91 N. E. 112o; Matter of Douglass, 120 Misc. 193, 198 N. Y. Supp. 792 (1923);
Matter of Silsby, 229 N. Y. 396, 128 N. E. 212 (1920).
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infants who might not be in esse at the creation of the trust,197 nor
by lives not in being,198 though the life of a child en ventre sa mere
is a proper measuring life.19 9 It is a matter of construction to deter-
mine whether a trust is properly measured by lives in being, or on
some other basis.20 It is not required that the measuring lives be
those of beneficiaries. A trust may be validly limited on the lives
of strangers, 20' or on the life of the trustee,20 2 or of any beneficiary, 20 3
and when so limited, any number of persons may share in the income
and profits.'1 So where a trust of residue was created for the life
of the widow, during which time the income was to be divided into
three parts, one for the wife and one for a daughter and one for a son;
and upon the death of the wife the whole was to be divided into two
trusts for the two children, with certain other dispositions on the
contingencies of deaths, the arrangement was held legal.20 5 Peckham,
J., expressed the matter in the following words:
"A trust may suspend the power of alienation for a period of
two selected lives in being at the creation of the estate, and dur-
ing that time he may make such disposition of the annual income
'
97Greenland v. Waddell, supra note iii, income of trust to A for life, then on a
contingency for her lawful issue until they reach 21, void; Schlereth v. Schlereth,
x73 N Y. 444, 66 N. E. i3o (19o3). See also Matter of Wilcox, supra note iii.
'
98Schettler v. Smith, supra note 114; Genet v. Hunt, supra note 57; Read v.
Williams, 125 N. Y. 560, 26 N. E. 730 (1891), perpetual trust for charity void;
Hoyt v. Hoyt, 125 Misc. 95, 21o N. Y. Supp. 155 (1925); In re Chittick's will,
supra note 2.
'
99Cooper v. Heatherton, 65 App. Div. 561, 73 N. Y. Supp. 14 (1901).
20
'See, for example, Matter of Allen, II1 Misc. 93, 181 N. Y. Supp. 398 (1920),
aff'd, 236 N. Y. 5o3, 142 N. E. 26o, trust of capital stock to continue business,
with discretion to sell and apply corpus to widow, she to have one-half of income
before sale and all after, step-daughter to have income after death of widow,
provisions for employees and for various charges, ultimate remainder to religious
corporation. The trust was held measured on lives of widow and step-daughter,
and not so long as business profitable. Cf. Freeman v. Hanna, 178 App. Div.
63o, I65 N. Y. Supp. 488 (1917), trust to hold stock and vote and collect dividends
not properly limited; and Matter of Toch, 178 App. Div. 544, 165 N. Y. Supp.
559 (1917), for such a trust properly limited.
20'Bailey v. Bailey, 97 N. Y. 46o (1884); Cochrane v. Schell, supra note 9;
Bird v. Pickford, 141 N. Y. 18, 35 N. E. 938 (1894).202Crooke v. County of Kings, supra note 61; Crehan v. Megargel, supra note
166, business trust to invest in limited partnership.
203Mvlanice v. Manice, supra note II, at 386; Stringer v. Young, 191 N. Y. 157,
83 N. E. 690 (I9O8).
2°In Crooke v. County of Kings, supra note 202, trustee was measuring life
for nine beneficiaries. Judge Finch suggested a distinction between the natural
term and the stipulated term (at p. 436). Accord: Kahn v. Tierney, supra note 193.
znsSchermerhorn v. Cotting, supra note 193, at 58.
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among as many persons as he sees fit. Thus having created a
trust term which must end within the period required by the
statute, he may provide that the income shall be paid during
that time to A for life, remainder to B for life, remainder to C
for life, and so on for as many different lives as he chooses, pro-
vided the whole first term must end with the death of the survivor
of the two lives.
"A limitation of a trust estate for an arbitrary period of time,
such as 50 years, is valid, provided a termination at an earlier
period is called for by the expiration, of two lives in being at the
creation of the trust."
Nor is it ground for objection, where the trust is properly limited,
that the beneficiaries are not ascertained and will or might include
unborn persons.208
Where suspension of the power of alienation is caused by the
limitation of a trust to commence i-n fituro,20 7 such trust must
commence and terminate within two lives in being at the creation
of the interest. Illegal suspension of the power of alienation may
also be caused by a remainder, contingent as to the person, which
may vest in interest at a time too remote, after the termination of
a prior trust.20
A trust may be divisible. Even where a trust appears, at first glance,
to be measured by the lives of more than two persons, it is often
possible to find that the testator or settlor has in fact created two
or more trusts in one undivided fund, which is kept in solido for con-
venience only. In Leach v. Godwin,2 9 -Chase, J., said:
"In cases where a trust for the benefit of several persons is held
in one fund it is necessary for the purpose of holding that they
constitute separate and independent trusts that every part of
the principal fund. should be liberated from the trust fund upon
the termination of the lives in being at the death of the testator
for which the trust is held and also to find from within the will
itself that such was the intention of the testator."
In that case it appeared that the testator intended only a division of
income into shares, and that the corpus should not be held in separate
206Gilman v. Reddington, supra note 63; Woodgate v. Fleet, 64 N. Y. 566, 571
(r876). In the latter case Rapallo, J., said: "A trust to receive and apply the
rents and profits of lands, the duration of which cannot extend beyond the lives
of two designated persons, in being at the time of the creation of the trust, is
permitted by the statute, and its validity is not impaired by the circumstance
that during this authorized period of suspension of the power of alienation more
than two persons are to enjoy the benefit of the income, or even that some of
the designated beneficiaries are not in esse at the time of the creation of the trust."
207Garvey v. McDevitt, supra note 137.
208Fargo v. Squires, supra note ig; Benedict v. Salmon, supra note 145.
201198 N. Y. 35, 41, 91 N. E. 288 (I9io), citing the leading cases.
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shares, and so it was held to be one indivisible trust. As to when the
intention to create separate trusts will be found, the language of
Cardozo, J., in Matter of Horne 1 is illuminating:
"If the dominant purpose is the creation of a single trust sub-
sisting during four minorities, absolute ownership is illegally
suspended * * *, and the trust in its entirety is void, even though
in some contingencies it may end within the statutory term
(Central Trust Co. of N. Y. v. Egelston, 185 N. Y. 23; Leach v.
Godwin, ig8 N. Y. 35). On the other hand, if the dominant
purpose in the creation of the trust is that of division into
separate shares terminable by separate minorities or lives, trusts
to that extent may be upheld, even though in some other con-
tingency it is to be illegally prolonged (Matter of Cosgrove, 221
N. Y. 455). We must say whether unity or pluralism is the
predominating note. * * *
"The will in all its provisions is instinct with the thought
that each of the four children has a *share or interest of his own,
which upon majority or death must be distributed anew."
Soin this case in which there was a trust for the benefit of children of
R, wherein they were named and it was directed that each should re-
ceive his or her interest in the trust fund on reaching the age of 2 1, or the
issue of each should receive the portion should any die before 2 1, it was
held that separate trusts were created. But as to a similar trust for the
children of G, where the children were not named, and only one was
in being at the death of the testator, and the trust was so worded as
to include afterborn children, it was held that no separation of the
share of the one child could be made since the shares were "in a
state of flux, the provisions for the living child hopelessly commingled
* * * with those for the use of children to be born in the future."21
By the application of these principles a trust for the benefit of the
testator's widow and after her death for the children, or a trust for
the benefit of several children, may be treated as separate trusts,
and as a result no suspension of alienation will continue beyond two
lives in respect of any trust share.212 But if the intention is that the
corpvs of the fund shall be held in solido during all the named lives,
"'237 N. Y. 489, 493, I43 N. E. 655 (1924).
UIbid. 5oo.
2
'DePeyster v. Clendening, supra note ii; Savage v. Burnham, 17 N. Y. 561
(1858); Everitt v. Everitt, supra note 69; Schermerhorn v. Cotting, supra note
193; Matter of Mount, I85 N. Y. 162, 77 N. E. 999 (igo6); Cheever v. Cheever,
172 App. Div. 353, 157 N. Y. Supp. 428 (1916), extreme case; Matter of Silsby,
supra note I96; Mount v. Mount, 196 App. Div. 508, 188 N. Y. Supp. 170r (1921),
aff'd, 234 N. Y. 568, 138 N. E. 489; Matter of McGeehan, 2oo App. Div. 739,
193 N. Y. Supp. 856 (1922), aff'd, 237 N. Y. 575, 143 N. E. 748; Matter of
Buttner, supra note 2.
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and only the income is divided, and no part or share of the corpus
is to be released upon the death of each beneficiary, then the trust
will be entire and indivisible and may as a result suspend the power
of alienation illegally. 13
Illegal provisions of trust may be separable. By an analogous
principle, where a testamentary trust offends the rule against
suspension of the power of alienation as to some share or portion,
or as to some ultimate limitation, and the offending part can be severed
from the balance of the trust without changing the character of the
settlement or defeating the probable intention of the testator, the
court will cut off the void portion and preserve the balance of the
trust.2 14 It should be noted that in this situation the court has
found it possible to separate the good from the bad, and thereby
preserve the valid portion of a trust; whereas it is generally true that
a trust which may by any possibility offend the rule, is declared
wholly void. The principle is illustrated by the cases in which
invalid cross remainders between children, who are beneficiaries of
separate trusts, are destroyed, and thereby the principal parts of
the testamentary scheme preserved. As was said by Judge Cardozo
in Matter of Homer:15
"The line of cleavage thus drawn between what is to be kept
and what destroyed ... follows seams and contacts suggested
by the will itself. In the thought of the testator, the death of a
21 Central Tr. Co. v. Egleston, 185 N. Y. 23, 77 N. E. 989 (19o6); Leach v.
Godwin, supra note 209; Matter of Magnus, 179 App. Div. 359, 166 N. Y. Supp.
497 (1917); Matter of Thaw, 182 App. Div. 368, 169 N. Y. Supp. 430 (1918),
in which the trust fund was directed to be "held by my executor and trustee so'
long as any of the above three friends shall be living," and only after the death
of the survivor was the fund given over to a son; Matter of Homer, supra note
2io; In re Chittick's Will, supra note 2.
21
"The valid parts of the will can be separated from those that are invalid
without defeating the general intent of the testator to the extent of the valid
parts. (Matter of Hitchcock, 222 N. Y. 57, 73; Carrier v. Carrier, 226 N. Y.
114.)" Matter of Silsby, supra note 196.m-This was a trust to pay income to
widow for life, then in three equal shares to children for their respective lives,
then each share absolutely to surviving grandchildren, but if any die without
surviving grandchildren, then cross remainders. It was held that the interests
of grandchildren were not vested, and cross remainders were void, but rest of
will was upheld. Accord: Kennedy v. Hoy, io5 N. Y. 134, II N. E. 39o (1887);
Matter of Colegrove, 221 N. Y. 455, 117 N. E. 813 (1917); Matter of Trevor,
supra note 148; Hilly. Simonds, 125 Mass. 536 (1878). For cases where the court
was unable to separate the good from the bad part of the will, and so the whole
will failed, see Bailey v. Buffalo, etc., Co., 213 N. Y. 525, 536, 107 N. E. 1043
(1915); Mann-Vynne v. Equitable Tr. Co., supra note 49.
215Supra note 21o, at 499.
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child during minority is the signal for a halt afid new reckoning
(Carrier v. Carrier, 226 N. Y. 114, 124)."
On the same principle a provision for an illegal accumulation may be
destroyed and a trust for life preserved,216 or if continuation of a trust
for minorities of children after two lives is directed, it may be sus-
tained for the legal period and the balance cut off.2' 7 Or an added
illegal suspension by a codicil may be eliminated and the will proper
preserved.218 These cases illustrate the principle that "courts lean
in favor of the preservation of such valid parts of a will as can be
separated from those that are invalid without defeating the general
intention of the testator."219 Void cross remainders or illegal ultimate
limitations, though invalid, "will not'be allowed to invalidate the
primary disposition of a will, but will be cut off in the case of a trust
which is not an entirety."2' 0 Moreover, when it can be done con-
sistently with the language of the will under established rules of
construction, courts favor that construction which will preserve the
will as against one under which it would be defeated.2 "
Effect of postponing payment. It is established that if the beneficial
future interests under a will or settlement are vested in interest, and
the property is not held on a trust which vests the title in trustees,2' la
216Hascall v. King, supra note 46; Kalish v. Kalish, supra note II; Robb v.
W. & J. Coll., supra note 41.
2 17Matter of Central Union Tr. Co., x93 App. Div. 292, 183 N. Y. Supp. 671
(1920).
21 8Hertzog v. Title G. & T. Co., supra note II4; Matter of Abbey, 98 Misc.
5o6, 164 N. Y. Supp. 934 (1917), aft'd, i81 App. Div. 395, 168 N. Y. Supp. 1047.
219Matter of Hitchcock, supra note 114. See also Post v. Hover, 33 N. Y. 593
(1865); Kalish v. Kalish, supra note I9I, at 375, trust for years cut off; Matter
of Murray, 75 App. Div. 246, 78 N. Y. Supp. 165 (i9O2), to same effect; Carrier v.
Carrier, supra note 25, trust for maintenance of home for lives of husband and
wife preserved, continuance during lives of two daughters cut off.
220Matter of Silsby, supra note 196. Cf. Palms v. Palms, supra note 98, at 369.
niCases cited supralast seven notes, and see Everitt v. Everitt, supra note 69, at
85, vesting and cross remainders; Stevenson v. Lesley, 7o N. Y. 512 (r877), held
that survivorship of grandchildren referred to death of testator; Van Brunt v.
Van Brunt, iii N. Y. 178, i N. E. 60 (1888), surviving spouse construed to
refer to one in being at the death of testator; Corse v. Chapman, 153 N. Y. 466,
47 N. E. 812 (1897), vesting and cross remainders; Cheever v. Cheever, supra
note 212, allocation of property under exercise of two powers; Matter of Ossman v.
Van Roemer, supra note 148, vesting.
Cf. Kilpatrick v. Johnson, supra note 50, with Stevenson v. Lesley,- supra.
21 See Smith v. Edwards, supra note 120; Lewisohnv. Henry, 179 N. Y. 352,
72 N. E. 239 (19o4); Fulton Tr. Co. v. Phillips, 218 N. Y. 573, 113 N. E. 558
(1916). In the case first cited, Finch, J., said (at 1O3), "It has been often held,
that if futurity is annexed to the substance of the gift, the vesting is suspended;
but where the gift is absolute and the time of payment only is postponed, the
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but possession only is withheld from the owner, or payment over to
him is postponed to a future time, then no suspension of alienation
results. Thus in Matter of MurpkyAm after providing for certain
bequests, the testator directed his executors to divide the residue
equally between his wife and children, "the principal of each child,
however, not to be paid until they respectively arrive at the age of
thirty," and it was held that no trust was created and the interests
of the children were vested and only payment over was postponed,
so that on the death of one of the children before thirty her share
passed to her next of Idn. So in many cases where payment only is
postponed, it has been held that no suspension of alienation is caused,
thereby illustrating the proposition that the mere creation of a power
does not ordinarily occasion any suspension of the power of alien-
ation.22' In any given case it may be difficult to determine whether
the property is held by the executors under an "administrative
title,"-' giving them possession and actual management until the
time of payment arrives, or under a trust giving them the same control
and management, but with entirely different results, but the cases
have made this distinction. The distinction is, however, clear
where the delay in payment is incidental merely, or where the
executor can in his discretion make payment at a time earlier than
that indicated.2o
gift is not suspended but vests at once... Where the only gift is in the direction
to pay or distribute at a future time, the case is not to be ranked with those in
which the payment or distribution only is deferred, but is one in which time is of
the essence of the gift." Cf. Matter of Bray, i8 App. Div. 533, 102 N. Y. Supp.
989 (I9O2).
A vested remainder following a void trust, is preserved and accelerated:
Purdy v. Hoyt, supra note 141, at 451; Brinkerhoff v. Seabury, 137 App. Div.
916, 122 N. Y. Supp. 481 (i91O), aff'd, 2oi N. Y. 559, 95 N. E. 1123; Matter of
Berry, supra note 191; Matter of Hitchcock, supra note I 14.
mi44 N. Y. 557, 39 N. E. 691 (1895). Cf. Matter of Roberts, supra note 13o.
=Warner v. Durant, 76 N. Y. 133 (1879), payment of legacies postponed five
years; Bliven v. Seymour, 88 N. Y. 469, 478 (1882); Orr v. Orr, 147 App. Div.
753, 133 N. Y. Supp. 48 (1911), aff'd, 212 N. Y. 615, io6 N. B. 1037; Matter of
Hitchcock, supra note 114, payment of legacies postponed; Matter of Chittick,
supra note 2; In re Seif's Will, supra note 24, possession of realty by devisees
postponed until legacies paid. Converse v. Kellogg, 7 Barb. 596 (N. Y. 1849),
was overruled by Bliven v. Seymour, supra.
224Matter of Chittick, supra note 2, modifying 216 App. Div. 179, 214 N. Y.
Supp. 467. See p. 184 of opinion of App. Div.
=Cf. Matter of Hitchcock, supra note 114, with Matter of Trevor, supra
note 148.
2 PRobert v. Coming, supra note Ig; and cases cited supra note I56.
